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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to address the problem of global poverty and 
inequalities through a philosophical defense of what I take to be the most appealing 
normative view with respect to these issues, namely global egalitarianism. In the 
first chapter I outline the theoretical essentials of an institutional or practice 
dependent conception of global egalitarianism. Such a view is based on the 
assumption that our present international order and the institutions comprising it 
significantly shape people’s life prospects and have important distributive effects in 
determining terms of ownership, production and transfer, access to global public 
goods and life opportunities across the globe.  Insofar as these distributive effects are 
morally significant in shaping people’s life prospects, their normative underpinnings 
must be made explicit and ought to be subjected to standards of justice, which are 
moral constraints on the permissible inequalities in the effects of those global 
institutions.  
My view of global egalitarianism is strongly inspired by John Rawls’ 
domestic political conception of justice, at the same time, aims at overcoming the 
weaknesses of his international theory. The theoretical essentials of a global 
egalitarian conception of justice I argue for are the following.  i.) A practice-
dependent methodological commitment according to which global institutions and 
practices are the primary subjects of justice; ii.) A principle of global justice is an 
egalitarian moral constraint, in other words, it sets limits to the inequality generating 
effects of global institutions. iii.) Justification of a global egalitarianism must rest on 
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global public grounds; iv.) All persons are equally valid sources of moral claims 
upon the terms of global cooperation.   
Global egalitarianism has been subject to various philosophical challenges.  
Prominent amongst them is the claim that duties of egalitarian distributive justice are 
confined to members of a nation-state due to the normative features underlying the 
scheme of domestic social and political institutions, the so called, basic structure. In 
the second chapter of this dissertation I address three different variants of this 
critique. The bounded contribution view assigns special importance to domestic 
institution on grounds that its members mutually contribute to the production of the 
relevant social goods. As a result they owe each other fair return on the goods that 
they jointly produce.  The bounded constituency view maintains that members of a 
political association owe each other egalitarian concern based on the idea that its 
members are participants in a legal and political system of self-legislation, and they 
are co-authors of coercive laws through which they mutually determine each others’ 
fates. On the bounded cooperation view the institutions of the basic structure are 
necessary for the development of our moral powers and social capacities that make 
social cooperation possible. I argue that none of these critiques warrant restricting the 
scope of justice to the domestic context. While these underlying normative features 
might be relevant reasons that ground distributive duties, they either do not constitute 
necessary conditions for the application of egalitarian duties, or the morally relevant 
feature in question can be shown to be equally compelling at the global level. 
In the third chapter I make an inquiry into the appropriate form of 
justification a global egalitarian conception requires. Global egalitarianism has been 
most notably justified through an extension of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, by 
grounding global principles of justice in comprehensive liberal commitments. I 
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challenge this view, by showing why such an extension is insufficiently justified to a 
global public, and why global egalitarianism must rest on public grounds. Drawing 
on Rawls’ political conception of justice in his Political Liberalism, I explain why 
the appropriate way to justify principles under conditions of moral and religious 
pluralism is reasoning from political ideals embedded in the public culture of a 
society. Then, I proceed by demonstrating that public justification ought to be taken 
seriously not only in the domestic case, but even more so in the global case, due to a 
rich diversity of moral and religious doctrines characterizing the international public 
sphere.  
I then argue that global egalitarianism must rest on an egalitarian theory of 
justification, which I call justificatory egalitarianism. Justificatory egalitarianism is a 
form of justification that treats people as equally valid sources of moral claims, and 
does so by taking people seriously in their plurality of moral views and religious 
beliefs. Under conditions of global pluralism, this doctrine requires us to justify the 
norms underlying a social scheme to others on global public grounds, to reason from 
broadly shareable global public ideals, thereby offering justification the relevant 
others cannot reasonably reject. While this requirement of global public justification 
is a plausible conclusion for normative theorizing, whether those global public ideals 
are robust enough to support a global egalitarian conception is a case that still needs 
to be made. I will limit myself to theoretical speculations about the problem, 
although a strong scientific proof would require an extensive case study on global 
public culture, is relevant sources and actors.  
In chapter four I address the, so called, feasibility challenge to global 
egalitarianism, according to which the normative ideal it promotes or the institutional 
scheme it envisions is infeasible. The feasibility challenge for a theory of justice is 
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the following. Certain aspects of our social world are relevant in order normative 
theory to be action guiding, while other aspects of our social world are exactly what 
we need to be critically assessing. Therefore, a theorist needs to discern which facts 
to account for as unchangeable, hence as relevant feasibility constraints on the 
theory, and which ones to consider as object of critical assessment and social change. 
Some feasibility constraints are related to facts about human psychology and 
motivation while others are related to facts about our social world, institutions and 
resources. Given the scope and focus of my dissertation, I addressed one type of 
feasibility constraint, the fact of pluralism about moral views, which is likely to 
constrain the kinds of principles that can be accepted by others and hence the kind of 
justification that can be given in their support. Feasibility critics challenge global 
egalitarianism at the level of application and institutional design. Taking pluralism as 
a feasibility constraint, however, I aim to show that part of the feasibility charges can 
be already addressed at the level of justification. I argue that public justification is 
the kind of justification that is able to account for pluralism as a feasibility constraint, 
and brings a normative political ideal closer to a feasible ideal. 
The originality of the thesis advanced here consists in the idea that global 
egalitarian principles must be justified on global public grounds. While maintaining 
that the scope of justice must be global, it challenges those theories of global justice 
that justify their conception on cosmopolitan or comprehensive liberal grounds.  
Global egalitarian conceptions of justice, in particular the ones that promote a global 
difference principle have been developed already in the very first accounts of global 
justice. I believe that these views are on the right track in the normative requirements 
they promote, however, they are insensitive to the problem of justification under 
conditions of pluralism. In my view they fail to respond to the fact of reasonable 
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global pluralism, a relevant fact which limits the kind of justification that can be 
offered to global agents of justice. In order for global egalitarianism to be properly 
egalitarian in its justification, it must treat people as equals by taking them seriously 
in their different moral views and systems of beliefs. In other words global 
egalitarianism must take global pluralism seriously in the kind of justificatory 
argument it advances. 
Working out the concrete normative requirements of justice for the global 
institutional order is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I limit my inquiry to the philosophical analysis of the reasons that ground the 
extension of the scope of justice, followed by an account of the appropriate kind of 
justification global egalitarianism requires under conditions of global pluralism, and 
finally to working out the conditions that need to be met globally for global 
egalitarianism to be a feasible ideal. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Theories of Distributive Justice: 
Towards a Global Egalitarian Conception 
 
 
1.1. Elements of a Theory of Distributive Justice 
 
Theories of social or distributive justice have dominated contemporary political 
philosophy since the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice in 1971. 
Problems of “social justice, in the broadest sense, arise when decisions affect the 
distribution of benefits and burdens between different individuals or groups.”1 The 
theoretical spectrum is excessively broad, the solutions are complex, hence a full 
review of the various positions would take us beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, let me discuss the essential elements of a theory of distributive justice and 
point to some of the main distinctions at stake within the literature.  
 Various types of questions can be asked with regard to distributive justice. 
Firstly, one needs to decide on what basis we owe distributive concern to others. 
That is, on what grounds can principles be justified? Secondly, one must settle the 
problem concerning the kind of things that are to be just or unjust, in other words the 
kind of things to which principles of justice should apply to, and ask what is the 
relevant subject of justice. A theory of distributive justice can morally assessing the 
conduct of persons, an outcome state of affairs in terms of a distributive profile, a 
scheme of social and political institutions, or a social ethos that prevails in a society. 
                                                
1
  Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), Social Justice (Oxford: Balckwell Publishing, )  p.1 
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All of these judicanda (things that are to be evaluated) can in theory be just or 
unjust.2  Thirdly, one must ask how far these obligations reach and where boundaries 
of a distributive community are to be drawn. The question we are concerned with 
here is the adequate scope or the boundary of distributive justice. The various 
accounts include domestic, international or global solutions. Fourthly, we need to 
decide what is the basis of comparison among different persons’ social positions, and 
what sort of goods are we taking into account when assessing aggregate human well-
being in a society. This is an inquiry into the relevant currency or metric of justice 
and the most prominent accounts include primary social goods, happiness, welfare, 
resources, or capabilities.3 Finally, one needs to determine the rules according to 
which the relevant goods are to be distributed, and ask: What principles distribution 
does justice require? Egalitarian, sufficientarian and prioritarian principles constitute 
the most influential accounts concerning the requirements of justice. Reasoning 
about these five aspects of distributive justice involves different levels of analysis 
and the solutions reached constitute the different elements of a theory of distributive 
justice: ground, subject, scope, metric, and the principle of distributive justice. 
 All of these elements would deserve an in-depth discussion if the aim of this 
thesis were to develop a full blown theory of justice. My aim, however, is much 
more modest. This thesis focuses on the question concerning the appropriate scope of 
                                                
2
  The term judicandum is used by Thomas Pogge, Relational Conceptions of Justice: Responsibilities 
for Health Outcomes, in Sudhir Anand et al. (eds) Public Health, Ethics and Equity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) p. 141. For further insight into the subject or site question see the debate in 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, following the article by Gerald A. Cohen, “On the Site of Distributive 
Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs: Liam Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs; Thomas Pogge, “On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflection on 
Cohen and Murphy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29, no. 2. pp. 137-169  
3
  For primary social goods see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, for an in-depth discussion on the 
welfarist account see Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 1981. For a resourcist view see Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1981. For the capabilities account see the works of Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Amartya Sen, The Equality of What? Tanner Lectures at Stanford 
University, 1979.  “Capability and Well-being’ in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds. The 
Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 
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justice in the hope of convincing the reader that not only the domestic institutions 
also the global institutions are relevant domains of distributive justice, albeit the 
difference that might occur concerning the requirements of justice. While the focus 
of the thesis is on the scope of justice, other theoretical elements, such as the grounds 
of justice and the subject of justice will be scrutinized.  
 
 
1.2. Moral Concerns and Principles of Justice 
 
Our concern with global poverty and excessive inequalities is motivated by two 
different moral concerns: absolute deprivation and relative deprivation. That is, we 
are either concerned with how badly people are faring compared to an absolute 
standard of decency or basic needs, or we might object to the excessive inequalities 
in social positions based on a standard of permissible inequalities. According to our 
moral concern with inequality, we might consider it bad in itself or we might object 
to it on independent grounds. Moral assessment of both absolute and relative 
deprivation might proceed either by justification of an objective standard of 
evaluation, or by a comparative assessment between the current state of affairs and 
an alternative feasible state of affairs, in which aggregate human well-being in 
enhanced. So the fact that people’s life do not meet a certain standard or experience 
gross inequalities might be wrong in itself, or wrong compared to an alternative state 
of affairs in which they could be better-off. Theoretically both kinds of moral 
concerns could be combined with both types of moral assessments. Nevertheless, in 
the dominant  political theory literature of world poverty and inequalities, our 
concern with absolute deprivation is often matched with an objective account of the 
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threshold of decency, while permissible inequalities are worked out through a 
comparative assessment of feasible alternative institutional schemes under which the 
worst off might be better-off. 
 The various absolute deprivation views, primarily focusing on the problem of 
extreme poverty, have given alternative accounts of the metric of human well-being, 
such as suffering in terms of pain and pleasure, basic needs, basic rights, 
fundamental human rights, or capabilities to achieve valuable human functionings. In 
making an evaluative judgment concerning human well-being one has to establish a 
threshold, a standard of decency or a standard of a life lived with dignity that every 
human being must meet with regard to the proposed metric. Our duty of justice, on 
this account, consists in alleviating poverty and promoting a state of affairs where 
every human being meets the established standard, and our duty is discharged when 
this standard is met by all. Since justice requires from us to reduce human suffering 
or eradicate world poverty up to a certain threshold, this conception of justice is 
referred to as sufficientarianism or threshold egalitarianism. Justice requires that 
everyone meets a threshold of sufficiency independently of the inequalities that 
might occur beyond the threshold.4 
 On an alternative account we might be concerned not only with how people 
fare in absolute terms, but in comparison with others. In this case we are making an 
assessment of people's relative deprivation compared to other people on a global 
scale. Extreme poverty, according to this position, is objectionable in the face of a 
                                                
4
  For the basic rights account see Henry Shue, Basic Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980; for a human rights account see Sebastiano Maffettone, “Universal Duty and Global Justice.” in 
Robert. E. Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge (eds.) Blackwell Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007; for the capabilities account see Amartya 
Sen, Sen, Amartya. “The Equality of What?” Tanner Lectures at Stanford University. 1979 and 
"Capability and Well-being’ in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds.   The Quality of Life. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993. pp. 30-54. 
 13 
significant progress and development in the life-prospects of many. As Thomas 
Pogge poses the moral question,  
[h]ow can severe poverty of half of humankind continue despite enormous 
economic and technological progress and despite the enlightened moral 
norms and values of our heavily dominant Western civilization?5 
 
The reason why we object to inequalities on moral grounds have relatively little to do 
with the substantive value of equality itself. That is, we do not necessarily have to 
favor equality for the sake of equality, but, as Thomas Scanlon has famously pointed 
out, most of our reason for concern with equality can be established on independent 
moral grounds. Scanlon's account of the diversity of objections to inequality 
develops four of these independent moral grounds, namely human suffering, stigma, 
domination, and procedural fairness.6  
 The moral assessment of inequalities is based on a comparison between 
alternative institutional schemes governed by different principles of justice. The 
standard of justice is given by the principles regulating an institutional scheme under 
which the least advantaged group can be no better off.7 Among the feasible 
alternative institutional schemes, all of which involve certain extent of inequality 
among different social groups, justice requires of us to promote the one under which 
the expectation of the worst-off group is higher. A principle that places limits on 
permissible inequalities in a society is an egalitarian principle of justice. 
Our moral concern with global poverty and inequalities is further complicated 
by an account of the source of injustice. Disadvantage might result from the poor 
                                                
5
 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 3 
6
 For an in-depth discussion on the different objections to inequality see Thomas Scanlon, The 
Diversity of Objections to Inequality, in his The Difficulty of Tolerance, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. pp. 202-218. 
7
  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; Thomas Scanlon, “Rawls' theory of Justice,” in Norman 
Daniels (ed.) Reading Rawls (New York: Basic Books Publishers, 1985. pp. 169-206; Thomas Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls, Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 1989. esp. Ch 1. 
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capacities and talents one is born with, i.e. from natural and social lottery, from the 
bad life-choices one has made, or they might originate in social arrangement that 
have distributive effects on person’s life-chances. Whether we are concerned with 
disadvantage as a matter of chance or choice or whether we are concerned with the 
social institutions that relevantly affect life-chances, two types of arguments can be 
made with regard to justice. According to the first, natural or social luck can result in 
morally arbitrary disadvantages in a society, where justice implies a design of social 
institutions which compensate for these morally arbitrary disadvantages. The luck 
egalitarian argument with regard to global (in)justice makes the case for the country 
of birth as a morally arbitrary disadvantage. A person born in a very poor country 
with little or no natural resources, with inefficient systems of governance and 
production, in an oppressive regime further diminishing the already scarce life-
options,  has grave consequences for her life-prospects. Assessing only one of the 
many indicators of human well-being, average life-expectancy in certain parts of the 
world is between 35-40, while the most well-off citizens in the world enjoy an 
average span of 75-80 years. According to global luck egalitarians, such systemic 
radical inequalities are morally impermissible. Assuming that one’s country of birth 
is a matter of luck, radical global resource redistribution in called for in order to 
compensate for the resulting disadvantages.8 
In the second type of argument about the source of injustice social 
cooperation and the institutions governing it produce winners and losers, whose 
disadvantageous effects must be subject to moral assessment through a standard of 
justice. With regard to global injustices, theorists argue that global social 
cooperation produces winners and losers, whereby the disadvantageous effects must 
                                                
8
 See Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. 1979. esp. Ch 3;  
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subject to moral assessment. The empirical evidence supporting this claim is strongly 
contested and constitutes a continuous struggle between experts of international 
organizations and experts of global social movements, academics and activists alike 
Providing a full proof of the empirical validity of such an assumption and engage in 
the debate with the skeptics is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
For the purpose of this dissertation I take for granted that insofar as global 
institutions and practices have morally significant distributive effects on people’s life 
prospects across the globe, they constitute a relevant subject of justice. 
 
 
1.3. The Subject (Site) of Justice 
 
1.3.1. Justice as an Institutional Virtue 
 
The basic structure is one the fundamental notions in the Rawlsian theory of justice. 
Understanding why it constitutes the primary subject of justice is one of the keys to 
grasping the Rawlsian theoretical apparatus in its operation. The basic structure is the 
way in which the major social institutions fit together into one unified scheme of 
social cooperation. Major social institutions, such as the constitutional system, the 
most important legal and political norms and procedures, the economic system, the 
education system or the family structure present in a society, working together, 
influence the individuals’ life prospects, and what sort of status they will possess in a 
social scheme of complex hierarchies. 
The Rawlsian notion of an institution is a special one. By an institution, 
Rawls means “a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their 
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rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like.”9 Compared to other sets of 
rules, a Rawlsian institution incorporates a normative element: the idea of publicity. 
That is, if the requirements of these rules are mutually recognized by each and every 
participant, and constitute a “common basis for determining mutual expectation,”10 
only then can we talk about an institution in the Rawlsian sense. 
As Rawls distinguishes, a public system of rules can be thought of in two 
ways: 1.) in the abstract, and 2.) in practice, as the realization of that abstract ideal11. 
When we are to judge an institution as just or unjust, which meaning are we referring 
to: to the institution as an abstract set of rules, or to the realization of that abstract 
idea? What we need to assess with the standards of justice are potential institutions, 
that is, institutions thought of in “a certain time and space when the actions specified 
by it are regularly carried out.”12 Following Rawls’ example, the difference between 
an abstract and a realized set of rules can be demonstrated as follows. A national 
parliament is a pubic system of rules and procedures (party system, election, 
mandate, law-making procedures etc.). As a set of rules in a constitutional text, it is 
not yet an institution in the Rawlsian sense. Mere examination of the constitutional 
paragraphs will not tell us much about whether it is just or not. We are to make our 
judgments at a given time in a society under specific circumstances. People need to 
potentially exercise those rules and follow the procedures, in order for the parliament 
to be an institution in the Rawlsian sense. 
 Having clarified the Rawlsian understanding of an institution, I move on to 
discuss what role institutions play in his conception of distributive justice. The first 
thing we learn from A Theory of Justice is that “Justice is the first virtue of 
                                                
9
  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. p. 55. 
10
  Ibid. p. 56. 
11
  Ibid. p. 54. 
12
  Ibid. p. 55. 
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institutions,”13 that is, the two principles of justice directly apply to institutions (a 
public system of rules) and not to other possible subjects, such as actions and 
judgments of individuals, or to persons themselves.14 The principles of justice are to 
be located in a public system of rules, that is, in the major social institutions of a 
society. But, can we single out basic institutions of a society and assess them one by 
one? This is a common, however in my view, a misleading reading of the Rawlsian 
theory of justice. Assessing single institutions for their contribution to social justice 
is an inaccurate application of Rawls’ conception of justice. 
Rawls developed his idea of distributive justice in order to answer the 
following question: 
[H]ow are the institutions of the basic structure to be regarded as one unified 
scheme of institutions, so that a fair, efficient, and productive system of 
social cooperation can be maintained over time, from one generation to the 
next?15 
 
Rawls makes an important distinction between a single institution and the basic 
structure of the society as one unified scheme, and argues that a theory of justice 
ought to be concerned with the latter. Justice of a social system taken as a whole 
depends on the combined effects of the fundamental social institutions it 
encompasses. Therefore, a theory of social justice must take as its primary subject 
“the basic structure of a society [that is] the arrangement of major social institutions 
into one scheme of cooperation.”16 In another formulation: 
The basic structure is understood as the way in which, the major social 
institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental 
                                                
13
  Ibid. p. 3. 
14
  Ibid. p. 7.   
15
  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Erin Kelly (ed.) Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2001. p. 50. (emphasis added) 
16
  Ibid. p. 54. 
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rights and duties, and shape the divisions of advantages that arises through 
social cooperation.17 
 
If an institution is to be understood as a public system of rules, and the basic 
structure is the way in which major social institutions fit together into one scheme, 
then, the basic structure is a complex web of the most fundamental public system of 
rules in a society.  The basic structure is to be understood as background rules or 
ground rules18 through which other, less fundamental rules are shaped. The two 
principles of justice constitute a standard for these basic rules, as Samuel Freeman 
put it, a “rule for making the rules.”19 
“The basic structure is the primary subject of justice.”20 This might seem, at 
first, a form of “methodological modesty”21 on the part of Rawls, whose aim is to 
specify a limited domain, as a starting point, for considerations of justice. However, 
there is more to it than that. As the analysis proceeds, it will become clear how the 
basic structure as subject fits together with other fundamental ideas of justice as 
fairness. Four arguments are considered: a.) the division of moral labor, b.) the 
institutional division of labor, c.) its pervasive effects on life chances, and d.) the 
idea of social cooperation. 
 Let us first reflect on the primacy of the basic structure. Over what other 
considerations does the basic structure deserve priority? Samuel Scheffler draws an 
important distinction to clarify this point.22 He claims that there are two different 
                                                
17
  John Rawls,  Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. p. 258. (emphasis 
added) 
18
  The term is used by Thomas Pogge, in his Realizing Rawls, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
p. 8. 
19
  Samuel Freeman, Rawls, London: Routledge, 2007. p. 99. 
20
   Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7. 
21
  Samuel Scheffler, “Is the Basic Structure Basic?” in Christine Sypnowich (ed.) The Egalitarian 
Conscience: Essays in Honor of G.A. Cohen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 102-129 
22
  Ibid. 
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ways in which Rawls prioritizes the basic structure as the first subject of justice: 1.) 
“the division of moral labor,” and 2.) “the institutional division of labor.”23 
 a.) Division of moral labor: First, according to the division of moral labor24, 
the principles that govern the basic structure are distinct from, and must be 
established prior to, those that govern the conduct of individuals or their 
associations.25 In its most general form, Rawls makes a distinction between norms of 
morality in general, and norms of justice. In an early formulation, Rawls provides the 
underlying reasons in the following way. 
That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of the 
virtue of justice … [A] person’s obligations and duties presuppose a moral 
conception of institutions and therefore … the content of just institutions 
must be defined before the requirements for individuals can be set out.26 
 
Rawls further elaborates this idea in his essay, The Basic Structure as Subject.27 He 
argues that the two principles of justice are not super-principles that provide an 
answer for every moral question. They are not at all principles for guiding individual 
conduct directly. Rather, the principles are to regulate the fundamental public system 
of rules with the aim of guaranteeing just background conditions, within which 
individual transactions take place. Their role is to regulate the basic structure of a 
society, without aiming at providing general principles that also regulate the internal 
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life of associations (such as churches, universities, sport clubs) and the conduct of 
individuals.28 
 b.) Institutional division of labor: A second distinction that supports the 
priority of the basic structure rests on, what Rawls calls, the ‘institutional division of 
labor.’  Despite being rather vague in defining the constitutive institutions of the 
basic structure, Rawls is rather clear on the criterion for drawing the line between 
what belongs and what not to the basic structure. He draws a clear theoretical 
distinction between institutions that are part of the basic structure and guarantee that 
the background conditions are fair over time, and those rules that directly regulate 
the transactions between individuals and their associations. Principles of justice only 
apply to the background rules that regulate normal rules; or better, they apply to a 
“system of commonly accepted second-order rules … with offices and rules for 
identifying, applying and revising the many first-order rules.”29 
Elaborating on the institutional division of labor Rawls argues that, 
the accumulated results of many separate and seemingly fair agreements 
entered into by individuals and associations  are likely over an extended 
period of time to undermine the background conditions required for free and 
fair agreements.30 
 
When we judge single transactions in isolation we are assessing, what Rawls calls, 
local justice. Theorizing justice in such an isolated form does not correspond with his 
purpose. An agreement or an exchange might seem fair in itself, but evaluating it as 
fair does not really make sense until we do not know what fairness entails.  
Furthermore, if the purpose of the theory is to maintain fair background conditions 
generations over generations, initially fair agreements over time might accumulate 
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results that undermine the fairness of background conditions. It is enough to think 
about capital concentration as a result of free and fair market exchange. We start with 
an initial standard of fairness (i.e. a fair distribution of assets), then market actors 
make their free and fair exchanges (local justice). “For the outcome of these 
transactions taken together is affected by all kinds of contingencies and 
unforeseeable consequences,” Rawls figures, the only way to maintain justice over 
time, if his principles are directly applied to second-order rules, the institutions of the 
basic structure. 
 Why this distinction between two kinds of rules? What are the underlying 
reasons for the institutional division? Rawls argues, that since his aim is to establish 
and sustain fair background conditions, discharging this duty to individuals runs into 
several problems. Many think that the institutional division of labor is due to 
considerations of demandingness. That is, individuals are to be left alone to further 
their ends while the basic structure ‘works out’ justice for them.31 However, as 
Scheffler points out, the reason why the problem of background justice is reserved 
for the basic structure is not because it would be burdensome on individuals, but 
because discharging this task from the structure to individual actions constitutes an 
impossibility.. The assessment of background justice requires a wide informational 
basis that everyday individual actions cannot reasonably be expected to take into 
account. As Scheffler puts it, “rules of individual conduct are insufficient to preserve 
background justice.”32 It is the task (background justice) that determines the locus of 
justice, and since many individual acts cannot properly carry out the task, their 
guiding rules cannot be the adequate subject of justice. To summarize, the 
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institutional division of labor is not a matter of discharging responsibility from 
individuals to institutions; rather it is a matter of theorizing about what is possible. 
 c.) Pervasive effects on life chances. An often emphasized rationale behind 
the special role of the basic structure might be labeled the ‘pervasive effects claim.’ It 
is based on the fundamental idea that the form of society in which we live, 
pervasively affects our life chances, it affects our ambitions and hopes and, in part, 
determines the kind of persons we become.33 How are people’s deepest desires and 
lifetime goals be the effects of the social forms in which we are born and live? Rawls 
appeals to widely acknowledged sociological facts concerning the production and 
reproduction of culture over time.34 People’s desires are partly shaped by 
fundamental institutions, by the norms embedded in the political constitution, by the 
form the economic system takes, and in which individuals inherit, own, produce and 
consume. Often our ambitions are heavily influenced by acknowledging our starting 
position in society, the means available to us, or the goals reasonably reachable over 
our lifetime. 
Considering the problem of talents, Rawls further emphasizes the pervasive 
effects of the social order on people’s life-chances. As he points out, what is often 
considered a matter of luck is in effect, in part, a product of complex social 
contingencies. What are we acknowledging in a person when we say that he or she is 
talented? In the common sense of the term it has a connotation of luck, or of 
something undeserved; something that helps us to advantage, but we cannot take 
credit for it. Is this all there is to it? In demonstrating the effect of the basic structure 
on inequalities connected with talents, Rawls asks us to distinguish between two 
aspects of a talent. They might be called: a.) talent as natural capacity and b.) talent 
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understood as realized capacity.  Talents viewed as the person’s natural capacity, in 
the Rawlsian framework are considered “natural facts” therefore the unequal 
distribution arising from it “is neither just nor unjust.”35 However when we consider 
talents as realized capacities, the basic structure of a society takes on a significant 
role in determining the actual effects of the natural lottery on persons’ social 
positions and life prospects. Although a talent as mere genetic gift is considered a 
natural fact, thus not a problem of justice, it becomes a problem of justice as soon as 
we consider talents as realized capacities in an ongoing social cooperation. Quoting 
Rawls: “What is just or unjust is the way institutions deal with these facts.”36 
Imagine how many factors affect a natural born violin-genius’ chances to become a 
famous violinist, apart from her natural talents and the efforts she makes through 
daily practice. Among the relevant social contingencies are parental encouragement, 
social starting position that allows for private musical education, the existence of 
high level academies, and a society that values talents for classical music, just to 
mention a few. It is rather clear, that besides personal traits, social positions and the 
social forms in which they occur determine, in large part, the realized talents of 
persons. It is this effect of institutions, the way institutions deal with natural luck and 
social starting position is what Rawls’ theory of justice is set out to regulate. With 
Rawls’ words, “[w]hat the theory of justice must regulate is the inequalities in life 
prospects between citizens that arise from social starting positions, natural 
advantages, and historical contingencies.” 
 d.) Social cooperation. The influence of institutions on life-chances is only 
part of the story. As Freeman points out, many other, non-basic institutions have 
pervasive effects on people’s lives, such as religious institutions, universities or the 
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media. They shape people’s hopes and desires and influence the persons they 
become. So what makes the scheme of fundamental institutions the distinguished 
subject of justice? Freeman draws our attention to the point that the special role 
reserved for the basic structure is inherently connected with another fundamental 
idea in justice as fairness: the idea of social cooperation. He argues that basic 
institutions that make up the basic structure are “essential to social life …[and] 
necessary for productive social cooperation.37 That is, what distinguishes basic 
institutions from normal institutions (what Rawls terms associations) becomes clear 
once we have understood how it fits with a procedural understanding  of justice as 
fairness and the role it plays in the Rawlsian social contract doctrine.  
 
 
1.3.2. The Practice-dependence Thesis 
 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has shifted the focus concerning the task of political 
philosophy. According to Rawls, the question of theorizing about justice is not 
whether we could conceive of the best conception of justice for the best possible 
world starting from scratch. A question that has inspired philosophers since Plato.  
The question, in Rawls’ view is whether we can work out from where we stand, from 
here and now, a criterion for evaluating the justice of our historically evolved social 
institutions. Hence, Rawls takes the “real task” of the political philosopher to be the 
construction of “a social point of view that all can accept,” a conception of justice 
“that all can live with.”38  Reasoning about justice is rooted in our society and in our 
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time, it starts from moral ideals congenial to a profound understanding of ourselves. 
It is a view from somewhere, not a view from nowhere. This somewhere, a specific 
institutional context or social practice provides the source of justification for 
principles of justice. 
The practice-dependence thesis39 conveys the Rawlsian methodological 
commitment to reasoning about justice for institutions or social practices already in 
place. As a prominent Rawls scholar has recently put it, reasoning about justice á la 
Rawls consists in “constructing justice for existing practices.”40  According this 
practice-dependent methodological commitment, the requirements of justice vary 
according to the social practice in consideration. Principles of justice are thought to 
be yielded by a suitably characterized method of reasoning, the so called original 
position. The characterization of the original position, however, importantly depends 
on the nature and purpose of the social practice in question.  Based on this 
commitment, Rawls has argued that constructing principles for different social 
practices yields different principles of justice. What determines the normative 
requirements for one context or another, as Rawls put it, 
is the distinct structure of the social framework and the purpose and role of 
its various parts and how they fit together, that explains why there are 
different principles for different kind of subjects.41 
 
Rawls’ constructivist procedure can be applied to various subjects: to the 
basic structure of a self-contained society, to the international subject, the political 
                                                
39
 The term is used by Andrea Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality.” Journal 
of Political Philosophy (2008): 137-164. 
40
 Aaron James, “Constructing Justice for Existing Practices.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 
281-316. 
41
 John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples” in Rawls, in John Rawls: Collected Papers. Samuel Freeman 
(ed.). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 533. 
 26 
society of the peoples, or to a society conceived over time in order to include the 
claims of future generations.  
 
Each time the constructivist procedure is modified to fit the subject in 
question… A constructivist liberal doctrine is universal in its reach once it is 
extended to give principles for all relevant subjects including … the political 
society of peoples. Its authority rests on the principles and conception of 
practical reason but always on these as suitably adjusted to different subjects 
…, and always assuming as well that these principles are endorsed on due 
reflection by the reasonable agents to whom the corresponding principles 
apply. 
 
In developing a conception of justice for the basic structure or for the law of 
peoples, or indeed for any subject, … it is the distinct structure of the social 
framework and the purpose and role of its various parts and how they fit 
together that explains there being different principles for different subjects. 42 
 
An original position between ‘free and equal persons’ is how Rawls characterizes the  
domestic original position as the appropriate way to reason about the justice for a 
liberal democratic society. However, when shifting the context of analysis from the 
domestic to the international level, one must also consider the relevant disanalogies 
between the purpose of and the participants to the social practice in question. Rawls 
maintains that the relevant characteristics of the international society is primarily 
serving the purpose of peace as the background conditions for the prosperity of all 
nations, and as made up of more or less self-contained nation states. Then he designs 
an international original position whose aim is to work out the requirements of just 
international conduct between nations or peoples. 
In brief, the practice dependence thesis relies on the assumption that 
reasoning about justice starts from existing practices. First of all, one needs to 
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identify a social practice and account for its relevant characteristics. Then, based on 
these characteristics that constitute the grounding elements for a constructivist 
argument, reasoning about the requirements of justice can begin. It proceeds by 
setting up a hypothetical choice situation among the relevant agents whose choice is 
constrained by the nature and purpose of the existing practice. 
 
 
1.4. The Scope of Justice 
 
What is the relevant scope of distributive justice and what are the reasons that bound 
or extend the scope of justice, has been of significant concern to philosophers in the 
past three decades.43 When discussing the scope of justice, one must, first of all, 
clarify what sort of boundary is the subject of assessment. As Robert E. Goodin 
famously put it, “boundaries about people, not boundaries about territories that really 
matter morally.”44 That is, in order to make sense of the compound arguments 
claiming the rightness of existing state boundaries, we must critically assess, not the 
physical boundaries themselves, but rather the normative elements underlying their 
justification. What is at issue, then, is on what moral grounds can the boundaries of 
different human associations be justified, and which type of community provides the 
relevant context of distributive justice.   
                                                
43
 See for example Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989; 
Ononra O’Neill, Bounds of Justice; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Darrel 
Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, Boulder: Westview Press, 2002; Kok-Chor Tan, “The Boundary 
of Justice and the Justice of Boundaries: Defending Global Egalitarianism,” The Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 19 (2006); Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion and 
Autonomy, Philosophy & Public Affairs 30 (2001);  Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity 
and the State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 (2007): 3-39; Arash Abizadeh, “Cooperation, 
Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 35 (2007): pp. 318-358.   
44
  Robert E. Goodin, “What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?” Ethics 97  (1988) p. 686. 
 28 
On the most common view the scope of distributive justice is domestic. Let 
us call this the domestic thesis held by social liberals or domestic egalitarians. 
Challenging this view, cosmopolitan liberals or global egalitarians hold that the 
relevant context of distributive justice is the global order. Let us call this the global 
thesis.45 According to an third, intermediate position, both domestic institutions and 
the global order are relevant contexts of justice, but fundamentally different 
principles apply in the two contexts. Let us call this the international thesis or the 
discrepancy thesis between social and global justice. 
Theorists of the domestic thesis hold that the relevant context of justice is the 
nation-state due to the normative features underlying the scheme of domestic social 
and political institutions, the so called, basic structure. The relevant normative 
feature might be contribution to a mutual production of social goods, it might be joint 
authorship of the mutually binding laws, or it might be shared social meanings.  
The domestic thesis on distributive justice might be complemented by 
Hobbesian thesis concerning international morality, according to which outside of 
the state there is no justice. This is not necessarily the case, however.  Most social 
liberals hold that due to normatively relevant differences in the domestic and the 
global contexts, the requirements of justice differ. In other words, what we owe to 
our fellow citizens and those living outside of our state borders rest on different 
normative grounds and consist in different normative requirements. This dualist view 
of morality results in the discrepancy thesis46 between social and global justice, 
according to which some normatively relevant features that trigger our egalitarian 
duties of distributive justice are present in the domestic institutional context, while 
they are absent in the global context. The difference in the normative character of the 
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context yields different kind of duties. Special duties apply among fellow citizens 
while our relations towards outsiders are guided by general duties we owe to all 
human beings. Many domestic liberal egalitarians, thus, endorse a dualist thesis 
according to which egalitarian distributive duties of justice apply within our state 
borders while humanitarian duties of justice apply among all human beings.  
. The distinction between humanitarian justice and distributive justice is 
based on the grounds according to which we owe a duty to another person. Social or 
distributive justice is owed on the basis of shared social arrangements while the duty 
of humanity is owed on the basis of personhood or humanness, independently of and 
prior to the institutions and practices that bind us. Accordingly, they are owed to all 
human beings. Such humanitarian duties of aid or assistance might have distributive 
effects, but the moral grounding makes the important difference between the two 
concepts.  
According to the dualist view distributive justice is grounded in the 
underlying normative features of shared institutions and their requirement consist in 
justifying the departure from equality in the effects of those institutions on people’s 
life prospects. Humanitarian justice is grounded in moral personhood attributing 
equal moral status to all human beings, and its requirement consist in guaranteeing 
for all whatever human goods are necessary for the exercise of such a moral status. 
Rawls’ account of a natural duty is illuminating to understand the kind of duty in 
question. Natural duty is a kind of duty owed prior to and independent of the 
institutional relations and the social practices that bind us together. “They obtain 
between all as equal moral persons.”47 Mutual aid is one such duty, and it requires us 
to help “another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without 
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excessive risk or loss to oneself.”48 The duty is typically discharged once the 
suffering is alleviated or the need fulfilled on the recipient side. The requirements of 
justice, then involve some sort of a threshold or sufficientarian principle.  
Challenging this discrepancy thesis cosmopolitan liberals argue that the 
normatively relevant feature in the domestic context is similarly relevant or 
analogous in the global context, hence the principles that apply socially should also 
apply globally. In the following sections, I further explore this debate and point to 
the main differences by analyzing the Rawlsian domestic thesis extended to an 
international thesis, and the challenges raised by the most prominent cosmopolitan 
liberals. 
 
1.4.1. The Discrepancy-thesis: Domestic vs. International Justice 
 
As we have seen above, according to the Rawlsian notion of social justice, justice is 
the first virtue of social institutions, and it primarily applies to domestic social 
institutions, the so called basic structure. The question posed in his A Theory of 
Justice is what principles of justice should govern the fundamental institutions of 
liberal democracies. In order to answer the question, Rawls runs a thought 
experiment, and imagines a hypothetical contract situation, and asks: What principles 
would parties adopt when symmetrically situated and having the relevant information 
for reasoning about justice? So construed, the original position is the appropriate 
normative point of view, from which one can derive the two principles of justice: 1.) 
maximum scheme of equal basic liberties for all and 2.) inequalities are organized  
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such that they are to the advantage of the worst-off group in society (difference 
principle); attached to positions that are open to all under fair equality of opportunity. 
In order for his theoretical conclusion to hold, Rawls makes three relevant 
assumptions: 1.) the societies in question are in favorable socio-economic conditions; 
2.) full compliance: the principles are observed by all; 3.) the relevant scheme of 
social cooperation occurs in a more or less self-contained society with fixed 
membership.  
The Law of Peoples, John Rawls’ latest book is his most comprehensive 
account of his international thought: he discusses the problem of “international 
justice,” more precisely, the international conduct of liberal societies. He basically 
works out an international charter, a set of norms that ought to guide the foreign 
affairs of a Just International Society. It is explicitly aimed to be continuous with the 
political theory of a liberal democratic society, that is, political liberalism. Indeed, 
according to Rawls, a domestic political theory is incomplete without an adequate 
account of how liberal states, in their foreign affairs, ought to conduct their relations 
to other states. So, having elaborated his domestic theory of justice, which was 
rethought in order to account for  “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” Rawls, with the 
Law of Peoples , in 1999, brings to completion his liberal political theory, with a 
comprehensive account of just international conduct for liberal societies. 
The fundamental problem for Rawls in the Law of Peoples is the following: 
how to find mutually acceptable norms of international conduct for peoples so 
different in their institutions and political cultures. 
The roots of the Law of Peoples can already be found in A Theory of Justice. 
In §58, Rawls briefly sketches the idea of the Law of Peoples, which at that time he 
calls “the law of nations.” Extending the original position to the international realm, 
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where parties to the agreement are representatives of nations, will acknowledge a set 
of principles that are already familiar to us in international law, such as the principle 
of self-determination, the right to self-defense, or the compliance with international 
treaties. These principles ideally would serve the purpose of adjudicating conflicting 
claims among states.49 Rawls elaborates on this idea in a lecture with the title, The 
Law of Peoples, given in 1993, at the University of Oxford, within The Oxford 
Amnesty Lecture Series, extended and revised in the form of a book with the same 
title, “The Law of Peoples,” published in 1999.  
Why is it more accurate to say that The Law of Peoples is a theory of 
international conduct rather than a theory of international justice? It is a theory of a 
just liberal foreign policy, not a theory of justice, as it is understood by justice as 
fairness.  Rawls puts forward an idea of a just foreign policy for liberal societies. He 
always wears the glasses of liberalism, through which he contemplates on the 
possibilities of a just international society. In order to arrive at the principles of a just 
international society, we first need to understand starting from a just liberal 
democratic society, what its just international conduct would imply. So, his aim is to 
work out a set of principles, the Law of Peoples, which guide the foreign policy of 
just liberal societies:  
…the Law of Peoples is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a 
domestic regime to a Society of Peoples. I emphasize that, in developing the 
Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals 
and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people.50 
 
The point that Rawls emphasizes in the introduction is that he proposes a liberal 
theory of foreign policy. While reading through the book we should always 
                                                
49
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 378. 
50
 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 9-10. 
 33 
remember that he is examining the possibility of just international relations from the 
viewpoint of political liberalism.  
Rawls approaches the problem of international justice through ideal 
theorizing, which he then extends to non-ideal circumstances. The problem of ideal 
theory and non-ideal circumstances is a classical problem in political theory, and 
goes back as far as Plato’s Republic, where Socrates defends his ideal theory of a just 
polity from Galucon’s challenge. Socrates defends his case for ideal theory, where he 
works out the idea of perfect justice for an ideal polity, by assuming that citizens 
fully comply with the laws of the polity. As a response, Glaucon challenges the 
practical feasibility of any society conforming to laws arrived at in such a way. 
Socrates defends his case by claiming that a perfectly just polity is a regulative ideal. 
Only by postulating that all members are equally motivated in promoting the ideal, 
can we envision the best possible scheme for a polity. An Ideal theory aims at 
building a normative model for ideal circumstances, by assuming full compliance of 
the agents involved. 
In the Rawlsian literature, the reference to the distinction between ideal and 
non-ideal theory can already be found in TJ. By ideal theory Rawls means a theory 
that assumes two conditions: full compliance and favorable conditions. The members 
of this ideal international society, the Liberal and Decent Peoples, as they are 
construed by Rawls, they satisfy both conditions. First, full compliance: Liberal and 
decent peoples are cooperative members in the Society of Peoples and are willing to 
obey the laws agreed on in the original position. These societies are equally 
motivated to establish a stable and peaceful international framework. Second, these 
are societies under favorable conditions, which is due to their socio-economic 
developments, social institutions are able to meet the basic needs of their people. So, 
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Rawls works out the principles that ought to regulate international society, by 
making the above two assumptions. Then he asks: given these ideal circumstances, 
what are the just principles of international conduct? 
The structure of the argument is the following. First, Rawls extends “the 
general social contract idea to the society of liberal democratic peoples.”51 Then he 
further extends the same idea to the decent peoples, which, though they are not 
liberal, due to certain minimal requirements met they are nevertheless acceptable in 
the Society of Peoples. Rawls then moves onto Non-ideal theory by lifting up the two 
assumptions. First, he accounts for the cases where the assumption of compliance 
does not hold. Rawls calls these societies outlaw states, states that do not comply 
with the Law. Then, he leaves the second assumption of ideal theory, and accounts 
for the just international conduct towards societies in unfavorable conditions, i.e. 
“societies whose historical, social and economic circumstances make their achieving 
a well-ordered regime difficult if not impossible”52. Rawls calls these societies 
burdened societies, burdened by unfavorable conditions.  
When working out the principles of international justice, Rawls extends his 
domestic thought experiment to the international level with important modifications. 
The inquiry he makes in the international original position is: What principles would 
parties symmetrically situated agree to, in order to regulate their affairs at the 
international level? One of the most important discrepancies between Rawls 
domestic and international original position is the characterization of the parties to 
the hypothetical choice situation. While the domestic hypothetical contract is made 
between persons, the relevant parties to the international agreement are Peoples, as it 
is already apparent from the title, The Law of Peoples. A People is “an idealized 
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nation-state.” In international relations we are used to working with the notion of 
states or nations. So why does Rawls depart from these notions? 
Three features distinguish a People from a traditionally understood Nation or 
State: 1.) Institutional feature: it has “a reasonably just constitutional democratic 
government,” Why is this important? This feature, a democratic government, 
guarantees that it adequately represents its citizens fundamental interests. How a 
government signing international treaties ideally ought to be. 2.) Cultural feature: 
member of a People united by … common sympathies.” These common sympathies 
are not necessarily rooted in national, ethnic or religious ties. It is enough, for Rawls, 
to make his ideal case for a People, that citizens view themselves as participants in a 
common public institutional scheme and political culture. This assumption contains 
that there are no ethnic conflicts, and no groups aiming at secession, and postulates a 
fundamental integrity in the ideal of a People. 3.) Moral character: In international 
relations theory, states are concerned with advancing their rational interests in their 
international affairs. Departing from this realist stipulation, Rawls characterizes 
people to have a moral character. Peoples have a moral nature that limits the pursuit 
of this interest, in accordance with the basic principles of international society. 
People are not solely rational entities, they are more complex in character. Peoples 
want to cooperate with each other at the international level on mutually accepted 
terms.53 
Rawls’ international original position is a hypothetical contract between 
peoples, so construed. Representatives of peoples equally situated behind the 
international veil of ignorance reason about the principles that ought to govern their 
international affairs. In order to ensure the fairness of the choice situation, the parties 
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representing governments are behind the veil, do not know which People they are 
representing, what is the size of the population or its geopolitical status in terms of 
power. Since every representative can turn out to be representing small and week 
states, they will choose principles that will guarantee that no-one falls below a 
certain minimum prosperity. 
The most powerful explanation for such a disturbing discrepancy between the 
domestic and the global original position lies in properly understanding the Rawlsian 
methodological commitment to reasoning about justice. As a prominent Rawls 
scholar has recently put it, reasoning about justice á la Rawls consists in 
“constructing justice for existing practices.”54 An original position between free and 
equal persons might be the right way to reason about the justice for a domestic 
society. However, when shifting the context of analysis from the domestic to the 
international level, one must also consider the relevant disanalogies between the 
purpose of and the relevant participants to the social practice in question. Rawls 
claims that the international context is relevantly inter-national, i.e. consist in 
relations among nations, hence reasoning about the requirements of justice must be 
adjusted to such a context by appropriately characterizing its relevant participants 
among whom the problem of international justice arises. 
The Law of Peoples is, then a realistic utopia in its assumption of taking 
seriously the limits of the ideals embedded in the current international context. By 
concentrating on peoples as units of moral concern, and not on individuals, Rawls 
stays true to his ongoing commitment of reasoning about the requirements of justice 
by “starting form the political world as we see it.”55 If international law and 
international relations are dominantly constituted by nation states, as Rawls 
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maintains, then a suitable original position, on his view, must indeed reflect such an 
account of its participants.   
This discrepancy in the two original positions then leads to the discrepancy 
between the requirements of domestic and international justice. Instead of adopting a 
global difference principle, representatives of Peoples behind the international veil of 
ignorance adopt the principle of the duty of assistance. The duty of assistance is 
Rawls’ account of what affluent societies owe to poor countries. According to him, 
every people has a well-founded interest in achieving an international order that 
contributes to peace and prosperity among peoples. There are, however societies in 
the world, the so called Burdened Societies, which, as Rawls holds, due to their 
political institutions and corrupt political elites, their religious and moral traditions 
that support those institutions, the choices that they made in the past live in 
unfavorable conditions. Following Rawls’ reasoning, representatives of peoples 
symmetrically situated behind the international veil of ignorance, would agree to the 
duty of assistance, according to which every affluent People has a duty of assistance 
to help Burdened Societies in unfavorable conditions to achieve just domestic 
institutions that allow them to achieve prosperity within and peace outside of their 
borders. The international veil of ignorance that blocks all the information about the 
size, political power or the level of affluence of the specific people one is 
representing generates the rationale for such a choice. Since the purpose of assistance 
is international peace and stability, once a people has reached its target and became a 
well-ordered society no further assistance is required. In short, the duty of assistance 
for our international affairs has a target or cut-off point beyond which the duty is 
discharged.  
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1.4.2. The Critique of Inter-national Justice 
 
The idea of international justice or the discrepancy thesis between social and global 
justice has been the subject to criticism on numerous grounds. Let me consider here, 
what I take to be, the three most powerful critiques. 1.) Explanatory nationalism; 2.) 
Normative individualism; and the 3.) Status quo challenge. 
According to the explanatory nationalism charge, advanced by Thomas 
Pogge, the idea of a people relies on false empirical assumptions concerning the self-
contained nature of domestic societies. The moral assessment of international 
inequalities in The Law of Peoples is based on the so called “purely domestic poverty 
thesis,” according to which world poverty and  radical inequalities are due to solely 
domestic factors. Poor countries are poor due to choices they themselves made, such 
as bad economic choices, lack of democracy that would otherwise hold elites 
accountable to the poor masses, lack of political and economic virtues of its members 
due to cultural background, bad population policy, or corrupt elites. They might also 
be poor because of their unfortunate natural environment, such as, desert, barren 
land, mountain area or natural catastrophes. As Rawls says in The Law of Peoples, 
… the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their 
political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that 
support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as 
in the indoustriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported 
by their political virtues …56 
 
According to Pogge, Rawls misconstrues the causes of poverty and overlooks the 
fact that domestic factors are themselves significantly shaped by global factors. As 
Pogge writes, 
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A society’s economic position arises from the interplay between national and 
global factors. With economically weak societies especially, global factors 
are dominant, even shaping such national factors as what kinds of persons 
gain political power, what incentives these leaders face, what options they 
have, and how implementation of any of the options would affect national 
economic performance.57  
 
Pogge describes at length two international institutions that are particularly 
worrisome in contributing to severe deprivations in the world. Any group who 
exercises power in the country (dictators and oppressive regimes), independently of 
how they come to power and how they exercise that power, are recognized as 
legitimate actors in the international arena. According to the International Borrowing 
Privilege, dictators may borrow freely huge amounts of money, thereby indebting 
future generations of the country, the might use it for weapons to oppress its people, 
however the obligation to repay the debt falls on the people often future generations. 
Similarly in the case of International Resource Privileges, oppressive 
regimes may act upon the natural resources of the country, selling them to global 
corporations, or other governments, even up to the level of irreversibly depleting 
those resources. Dictators may drain the resources of an already very poor country, 
use the gain for military purposes externally or internally to oppress their people, 
which often leads to the full impoverishment of regions. 58 
The normative individualism challenge is based on the liberal tenet according 
to which the ultimate units of moral concern are persons or individuals. As many 
critics have pointed out, while Rawls endorses normative individualism in his 
domestic theory and takes free and equal moral persons to be the unit of moral 
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concern, he departs from this important assumption by postulating peoples as 
relevant units for the Law of Peoples.59 Although in the description of a people 
Rawls emphasizes that an ideal people will perfectly represent the interest of its 
members, thereby assuming a full match between the interest of persons and the 
interest of a people representing those peoples, critics have shown that this 
assumption involves a false idealization: the interest of a people and its members do 
not necessarily coincide.60 If it is the interest of persons that ultimately matter 
morally, as Rawls notes even in his Law of Peoples,61 then the international original 
position among peoples will fail to represent such a consideration.  
It is enough to think of the difference between international poverty and 
inequalities measured between states as average well being in a country, and global 
poverty and inequalities measure between individuals or households across the globe. 
If an account of distributive justice is based on the former measure it remains 
insensitive to the enormous intra-country inequalities that are deeply characteristic of 
developing countries as well as developed ones, and fails to adequately represent the 
interests if the worst-off population in the world. 
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1.4.3. The Idea of Global Justice 
 
The idea that the scope of distributive justice is global was first developed three 
decades ago by prominent critics of A Theory of Justice, such as Thomas Scanlon 
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge.62  They have argued that the kind of social 
cooperation that triggers the demands of distributive justice is relevantly present in 
the global context due to the level of interconnectedness brought about by economic, 
political and social globalization. The distributive effects of global institutions and 
practices should, therefore, be morally constrained by a global difference principle 
worked out through a global original position among free and equal moral persons. 
We might call this the global basic structure view.  
 This view has been strongly contested on the basis of weak empirical 
evidence for the analogy between the domestic and the global context, or based on 
the flawed understanding concerning the normatively relevant features of the basic 
structure. Critics point out that the normatively relevant feature of the domestic basic 
structure is either absent, too thin or irrelevant in the global institutional context. By 
now, conceptions of global justice have become much more sophisticated, based on 
strong empirical evidence from the practices of international law, global institutions 
and decision making, and global civil society social movements.  
While most of the global justice scholars refrain from advocating a global 
difference principle, they argue that global justice requires more than a humanitarian 
minimum, and that global institutions and rule making, insofar as they have 
distributive effects on people’s lives, must be morally constrained by principles of 
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justice. The varieties of justice triggering reasons include the claim that international 
agreements are morally consequential on people’s lives all over the world;  that 
international rules of trade, security or the environment are not mere inter-state 
agreements, but the practice of international institutions has evidenced de facto 
independence from states; or the idea that our everyday conduct depends on other 
peoples actions and everyday labor that put us is a morally significant relation vis a 
vis distant people. 
  
 
1.5. Towards a Global Egalitarian Conception of Distributive Justice 
 
The idea of global justice, that is to be defended in the following chapters of this 
dissertation, is both strongly inspired by John Rawls’ domestic political liberalism, 
and at the same time involves a departure from his view. Firstly, it follows the 
Rawlsian institutional or practice-dependent view of justice, according to which 
principles of justice are to regulate social and political institutions and their 
distributive effects on people’s life chances. Secondly, it is an egalitarian view, in 
the broadest sense of the term, according to which inequalities in life-chances are to 
be morally assessed through standards of justice. That is to say, what matters morally 
is not merely how people fare in absolute terms, but how they fare vis-à-vis each 
other. Thirdly, it endorses the idea of Rawlsian political justification, according to 
which, under conditions of pluralism, standards of justice are to be justified on public 
grounds, starting from commonly shared political ideals.  
The departure from Rawls consists in a challenge to the domestic scope 
thesis, according to which principles of distributive justice apply to the basic 
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structure of a self-contained society. In chapter two I will argue why the different 
versions of the domestic scope thesis fail to limit the scope of justice to a domestic 
society, and why those reasons fail to warrant a domestic scope of justice. This 
challenge is based on the assumption that our present international order and the 
institutions comprising it significantly shape people’s life prospects and have 
important distributive effects in determining terms of ownership, production and 
transfer, access to global public goods and life opportunities across the globe.  
Insofar as these distributive effects are morally significant, they ought to be subjected 
to standards of justice, which limit permissible inequalities in the effects of those 
global institutions on people’s life-chances.  Secondly, it aims to complement the 
Rawlsian idea of political justification, with a moral defense of why public 
justification is the appropriate justification to offer to others under conditions of 
pluralism. As the argument of chapter three will demonstrate, public justification can 
be supported by, what I call, justificatory egalitarianism, i.e. taking people as equally 
valid sources of moral claims under conditions of pluralism.  
The originality of the thesis advanced here consists in the claim that global 
egalitarian principles must be justified on global public grounds. Global egalitarian 
conceptions of justice, in particular the ones that promote a global egalitarian 
principle have been developed already in the very first accounts of global justice.63 I 
believe that these views are on the right track in the normative views they promote, 
however they are insensitive to the problem of justification under conditions of 
pluralism. In my view they fail to respond to the fact of global pluralism, a relevant 
fact which limits the kind of justification that can be offered to global agents of 
justice. In order for global egalitarianism to be egalitarian in the right sense, it must 
                                                
63
 See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Pogge, Realizing Rawls.  
 44 
treat people as equals by taking them seriously in their different moral views and 
systems of beliefs they hold. In other words global egalitarianism must take global 
pluralism seriously in the kind of justificatory argument it advances. The thesis 
advances in the following chapters, especially in chapter three, is an attempt to work 
out the conditions of global public justification, a form of justification that treats 
people as equally valid sources of moral claims.  
To sum up, the conception of global justice supported in this dissertation is an 
institutional egalitarian conception of global justice that rest on four fundamental 
claims.  
i.) A practice-dependent methodological commitment according to which 
global institutions and practices are the primary subjects of justice;  
ii.) A principle of global justice is an egalitarian principle, i.e. inequalities in 
the distributive effects of those institutions on people’s life prospects 
requires moral justification;  
iii.) Justification of a global egalitarian principle of justice must rest on 
global public grounds;  
iv.) All persons are equally valid sources of moral claims upon global 
institutional arrangements. 
 
An important point must be made here. Although the conception of justice that I am 
arguing for is a global egalitarian conception, it does not necessarily lead to 
endorsing a global difference principle. According to the Rawlsian institutional or 
practice-dependent methodological commitment, the requirements of justice vary 
according to the social practice in question. Principles are constructed for existing 
practices, that is, they are yielded by a suitably characterized method of reasoning, 
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the so called original position. The characterization of a suitable original position 
depends on the nature and purpose of the social practice in question. Based on this 
methodological commitment Rawls has argued that constructing principles for 
different social practices yields different principles of justice. What determines the 
normative requirements for one context or another, as Rawls put it, 
is the distinct structure of the social framework and the purpose and role of 
its various parts and how they fit together, that explains why there are 
different principles for different kind of subjects.64 
 
On a public view of justification, the principles a constructivist procedure yields, 
depend on the political ideals present in the public culture of the relevant context. 
Through a careful analysis of the political ideals present in the domestic and the 
global context one must examine the relevant analogies and dis-analogies of the two 
public contexts in question.  What principles ought to regulate global institutions and 
their distributive effects on people’s life chances will depend on the global public 
ideals one can take for granted as fundamental ideas grounding the edifice of 
justification.  
Working out the concrete normative requirements of justice for the global 
institutional order is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will put aside this very relevant normative question and limit my inquiry to 
the philosophical analysis of the reasons that ground the extension of the scope of 
justice, followed by an account of the appropriate kind of justification global 
egalitarianism requires under conditions of global pluralism, and finally to working 
out the conditions that need to be met globally for a global egalitarianism to be a  
feasible ideal. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
The Basic Structure as Boundary? 
 
 
2.1. The Basic Structure Argument 
Since its first formulations, concentrating on a global difference principle, global 
egalitarianism has had to tackle various philosophical challenges. Among the most 
often raised criticism is the claim that distributive justice is a duty confined to 
members of a nation-state due to the normative features underlying the scheme of 
domestic social and political institutions, the so called, basic structure. Justifying the 
discrepancy or the continuity between social and global distributive justice often 
stands or falls by the use one makes of the basic structure argument. With the basic 
structure argument, I refer to those views, which maintain that principles of 
distributive justice apply only among members of a society in virtue of the basic 
social institutions they share in. Arguments for the domestic scope of the basic 
structure contain a rich diversity of bounding reasons, yet they all conclude that the 
basic structure of a more or less self-contained society constitutes the adequate 
context of distributive justice, hence the extension of the scope to the international 
context is an implausible move. Theorists argue that the global institutional context is 
disanalogous to the domestic one, insofar as the relevant features that trigger the 
duties of justice are not properly present, too thin, or irrelevant in the global 
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context.65 Theorists arguing for a global scope of justice challenge this position by 
showing that the normatively relevant feature of the basic structure is equally or 
partially relevant in the global context, hence an extension of the scope of justice is 
required.66 
Taking a step back from this discrepancy debate seems to me a necessary 
theoretical move. Before we can examine whether the normatively relevant feature of 
the basic structure is or is not a relevant feature in the global context, we need to 
provide a sound account of what exactly makes the Rawlsian basic structure the 
adequate context of justice. In order to engage with the global justice debate, 
properly understanding the crux of the basic structure argument seems to me 
unavoidable. Therefore, the question to be examined in this chapter is the following.  
‘What reasons confine the duty of justice to a shared institutional scheme in the basic 
structure view on social justice?’ In another way: ‘What is so special about the basic 
structure for considerations about the scope of justice?’ 
Examining the global justice debate in light of the basic structure argument 
allows me to narrow the scope of the discussion to conceptions of distributive justice 
referred to as relational-institutional account or, more recently, as the practice 
dependence thesis67 on distributive justice. According to this view, the distribution of 
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social positions in a society is highly dependent on the institutional scheme in which 
individuals pursue their ends. How this institutional scheme operates and produces 
such distributive effects, therefore, needs to be morally assessed through standard of 
justice. Institutionalism about justice is associated with the, by now, classical work of 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. On his account, a conception of justice is concerned 
with the justifiability of the governing norms of our shared institutions. Principles of 
justice are to be worked out for an existing context of social cooperation, as 
standards publicly available to all, and used as reference points for reasoning about 
the normative structure supporting our scheme of social institutions. A justice-
relevant relation is one that connects people through institutional practices, and 
whose relevance is earned by the normative account of the institutional scheme in 
question. What differs among the diverging institutional views of justice is how they 
identify the normatively relevant feature of the basic structure. The justice-relevant 
feature of the basic structure provides the bounding reason in virtue of which the 
scope of justice is marked out. 
Given this assumption, I leave aside those arguments, which argue that the 
duty of distributive justice is owed to people independently of the institutions or 
practices that bind us.68 The theoretical move of bracketing this debate between the 
institutional and non-institutional theories of justice, however, is not meant to 
downgrade its importance. This question concerning the grounds and the proper site 
of distributive justice is crucial, and represents one of the key divides in the 
contemporary philosophical debate on social justice. In this chapter, however, I 
assume that the case for the plausibility of the institutional view has been made in the 
previous chapter. From here on, therefore, I work with the institutional or practice-
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dependent conception of justice according to which the role of principles of justice is 
to regulate our public affairs mediated by social institutions and practices. Principles 
of justice are normative standards for assessing institutions that distribute the burdens 
and benefits of a social endeavor; a standard that is justifiable to all its participants.  
Consequently, the duty of distributive justice is owed to those with whom we share 
in a normatively relevant institution or practice. What exactly constitutes this moral 
relevance is the question to be examined in this paper. The analysis of the ‘social-
global discrepancy’ that follows, takes place in this particular theoretical space. 
In the following chapter, I address three different views, which argue for the 
domestic-scope thesis on three different normative grounds. The contribution view 
assigns special importance to domestic institution on grounds that its members 
mutually contribute to the production of the relevant social goods. As a result they 
owe each other fair return. On the democratic self-determination view members of a 
political association owe each other egalitarian concern based on the idea that its 
members are participants in a legal and political system of self-legislation, and they 
are co-authors of coercive laws through which they mutually determine each others’ 
fate. On the social cooperation view the institutions of the basic structure are 
necessary for the development of our moral powers and social capacities that make 
social cooperation possible. I argue that none of the above reasons are conclusive in 
limiting the scope of justice to the domestic context. While these underlying 
normative features might be relevant reasons that ground distributive duties, they 
either do not constitute necessary conditions, or the morally relevant feature in 
question can be shown to be similarly relevant when morally assessing the nature of 
international institutions. 
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2.2. The Bounded Contribution View 
 
The first candidate to tie the normative feature of the basic structure to the 
boundaries of a nation-state, or any political organization sufficiently similar, is the 
bounded contribution view. According to the bounded contribution view, we owe 
each other egalitarian concern because we contribute to a shared scheme of social 
cooperation, and this common effort produces benefits that are advantageous for all.  
In the contemporary debate on distributive justice, contribution, as the ground for 
egalitarian concern, has been understood in (at least) two different ways: a) as mutual 
advantage and b) as fair reciprocity.69 This distinction marks the key divide in social 
contract theories and would deserve a long discussion, but for the purpose of this 
paper I will limit myself to briefly indicating the key differences necessary for our 
purpose here. 
 Without unfolding this debate in a comprehensive manner, the key distinction 
for our purposes is the following. Whether the return to our fellow contributors is 
proportional to the contribution they have made, or the return is a ‘fair’ return, 
independent of any measure of input to the cooperative scheme. Scholars have shown 
that two different assumptions are working in the background of these distinct 
views.70 In the first case, those who view the duty of justice as a proportional return 
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based on the idea of mutual advantage, one needs to assume a comparative baseline 
drawn at the point of non-cooperation, to which the benefits of cooperation are 
measured. Based on such comparison and one can conceptualize the fair agreement. 
According to the second view, justice as fair reciprocity, instead of working with a 
non-contribution point, the theorist assumes a benchmark of equality. The common 
feature in the two contribution views is that both draw on the assumption that 
people’s support for a social order rests on some sort of gain or advantage they can 
draw from it. What differs, however, is what sort of gain or advantage is meant by 
the theorist, depending on the benchmark of comparison they offer: non-agreement 
or equality. 
 The mutual advantage view poses the question in the following way. It asks 
us to imagine a counterfactual state of affairs where people have not agreed on any 
terms of cooperation (state of nature; non-agreement or non-cooperation point), 
examine how well people would fare on their own, and uses that as the benchmark of 
comparison for pointing to the benefits of cooperating with others. When this so-
called non-agreement point is taken as the benchmark, that is, people know how well 
they do without the social scheme in place, then, each individuals’ contribution can 
be assessed. The agreement among the parties is then characterized as a bargaining 
game, in which parties come to the bargaining table with asymmetrical bargaining 
power. They bargain from these unequal positions until they reach a distributive 
outcome that is acceptable to all. The fairness of a distribution, then, consists in an 
equal gain in terms of the satisfaction or utility each obtains at the agreement point. 
What makes the agreement fair is that each party feels equally satisfied with the 
outcome when walking away from the bargaining table. Notice, however that their 
might be gross inequalities in starting positions, bargaining can proceed in a context 
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of asymmetric power relations. Consequently what might seem fair when we are 
assessing utility gains in bargaining outcomes, can result in gross inequalities in 
terms of the actual goods that were to be distributed. This conclusion however does 
not render justice as mutual advantage internally incoherent. Since what justice is on 
this account, as Brian Barry put it, is  
“rational prudence pursued in the contexts where the cooperation (or at least 
forbearance) of other people is a condition of our being able to get what we 
want. Justice is the name we give to the constraints on themselves that 
rational self-interested people would agree to as the minimum price that has 
to be paid in order to obtain the cooperation of others.”71 
 
 The mutual advantage view of distributive justice has been hugely influential 
in game theoretical economic analysis. The various accounts of bargaining games 
have developed alternative non-agreement baselines, and work with slightly different 
utility assumptions, but their philosophical justification has been relatively 
untouched. The mutual advantage view might be a good account of fairness on its 
own right, and might be a good account of a fair agreement in bargaining games. 
However what is really questionable whether it is a good account of social justice. Is 
this what we are really concerned with when we are reasoning about principles of 
justice for a complex scheme of social cooperation? Should we be asking whether 
people with different social and economic status can or cannot come to an agreement 
over to distributing scarce goods? What kind of justice is the one that translates 
bargaining power into distributive advantages? Without settling the centuries old 
debate concerning what justice is, let me make a brief point about why an alternative 
view about the role of justice in a society might be more appealing. The alternative 
view on social justice might take a step back and ask the question how those initial 
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inequalities in power have occurred in the first place.  From this point of view, 
asymmetrical bargaining positions are in themselves morally arbitrary, therefore 
cannot constitute relevant information for reasoning about justice. When assessing 
the justice  of a social order, that is, when we are reasoning about social justice, what 
we need to ask is precisely how those initial inequalities occurred, and through which 
social and economic mechanisms do people arrive to possess the specific social 
status they possess. In this sense background social schemes that determine initial 
endowments become the primary subject of justice.  
 The most influential contemporary political philosopher who has defended 
this alternative view on social justice is John Rawls. In his theory of justice, justice 
as fairness or justice as fair reciprocity, Rawls makes a strongly appealing case 
against justice as mutual advantage or prudential self-interest. Assuming away power 
or thereat advantage as relevant considerations for reasoning about justice, he makes 
a case for a moralized notion of the social contract based on symmetrically situated 
parties behind the veil of ignorance. Instead of starting postulating inequality as the 
benchmark of comparison at the non-agreement point, he makes a strong case for the 
benchmark of equality. Which assumptions allow Rawls to stipulate this benchmark 
of equality? 
 One of the constraints on the Rawlsian procedure of construction is the idea 
of a self-contained society. An important feature of the hypothetical contract is that 
the idea of the parties to the original position is so construed that membership is 
fixed. Individuals are considered from birth to death as fixed members of an ongoing 
society, thus the dilemma whether another social scheme would be more 
advantageous for us to pursue our goals, does not arise. So the first assumption is that 
membership is fixed. Rawls elaborates that “membership in our society is given, and 
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we cannot know what we would have been like had we not belonged to it (perhaps 
the though itself lacks sense).”3  How we would fair in another scheme, is irrelevant 
to ask, insofar as the social structure affects which of the many possible persons we 
become. “[O]ur nature apart from society is but a potential for a whole range of 
possibilities.” What follows is that our contribution to society cannot be disentangled 
from the form of society in which we pursue our plans and realize our talents.  As 
Freeman explains,  
The question driving Rawls’s social contract is not whether it is mutually 
advantageous to enter into cooperation with others or how much we have to 
gain by cooperation as opposed to noncooperation. Instead, members of a 
society have no choice but to cooperate with others and indeed are presumed 
to want to cooperate with others on terms that are fair.72 
 
 Assuming that we are part of a self-contained, ongoing scheme of cooperation 
through generations, there is no merit, no social advantage, and no initial endowment 
without the underlying social institutional scheme that assigns those benefits, 
advantages and entitlements. Therefore, Rawls argues, a conception of justice, in the 
first place, is to assess and regulate those fundamental norms that shape our 
advantages and disadvantages in a significant way.  Instead of bargaining advantage, 
this “social aspect of human relationships is reflected in the content of the principles 
of justice.”73 We cannot know how we would each fare without the cooperative 
scheme, hence the best we can do is to assume that all participants to upholding such 
a social scheme are equal participants. Each and every one of the owes a fair return 
to the other for maintaining the scheme.  
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 Another assumption that allows Rawls to assume the benchmark of equality 
and situate the parties symmetrically behind the veil of ignorance is due to his 
moralized conception of the person as free and equal. The conception of the person 
as free and equal is first drawn from Kantian foundations, which Rawls later 
modifies as our self-conception as citizens embedded in the public political culture of 
a liberal democracy. 
 Rawls assumes equality as the standard compared to which inequalities are to 
be justified. That is, when choosing principles of justice that would permit 
inequalities, those inequalities are to be justified, not compared to how people would 
fair without cooperation, but how they would fair compared to the benchmark of 
equality. As Rawls' well-known second principles states, inequalities are permissible 
insofar as they are to the benefit of the least advantaged group in society. Assuming 
that inequalities are incentive-generators, and the whole society as such would be 
better off compared to strict equality in social positions, Rawls places limits to what 
kind of inequalities are morally objectionable and which are morally permissible, 
given that he has made an appealing case in justifying his choice procedure, the 
original position. 
The moral equality of persons built into the characterization of the parties and 
the choice situation in the original position, besides reflecting important Kantian 
liberal moral foundations, also reflects the idea that in an ongoing system of social 
cooperation, i.e. the Rawlsian conception of a society, the contribution of a single 
individual is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle from the scheme as a whole. 
Each person's social position, “the kind of persons we are and the kind of persons we 
want to be,”74 depends on a social scheme upheld by all of its members. How well a 
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single individual is doing depends on the overall operation of a complex social 
scheme. Furthermore, given the temporal dimension in the notion of Rawlsian social 
cooperation, current generations' burdens or benefits depend on the contribution of 
past generations and affect the distribution of social positions of future generation. 
So, if we find Rawls' basic idea of the society as an ongoing system of social 
cooperation appealing, then it is easy to see why justice as fair reciprocity is a more 
plausible understanding why we owe a fair return for all those participating in 
upholding a common social scheme of cooperation, and why justice as fair 
reciprocity the more plausible view on distributive justice. 
 In the global justice debate Andrea Sangiovanni's account75 echoes the idea of 
distributive justice as fair reciprocity. According to him the state provides the 
relevant context of distributive justice in virtue of our mutual contribution in the 
production of  basic social goods. As Sangiovanni puts it, the duty of distributive 
justice is a requirement of “reciprocity in the mutual provision of the basic collective 
goods necessary for acting on a plan of life.”76 While each of us is carrying out a life-
plan based on individually chosen ends and means, the realization of our plans 
depend on a background social framework that all of us rely on, and that partly 
shapes our goals and determine the available means for us. This mutual contribution 
requires fair reciprocity from our fellow contributors. Contribution to such a 
common endeavor is the triggering reason for the duty of justice, but which is the 
relevant context in which the production of basic collective goods occur?  
Sangiovanni claims that the relevant context is the state, or any organization 
sufficiently similar from a social goods producing point of view, such as the 
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European Union. In order to support the claim that the state provides the adequate 
context of justice, Sangiovanni relies on a methodological commitment, the so called 
practice-dependence thesis on justice. According to this thesis, “[t]he content, scope, 
and justification of a conception of justice depend on the structure and form of the 
practices that the conception is intended to govern.”77 His practice-dependence thesis 
is based on a well-known Rawlsian tenet, according to which, a conception of justice 
depends on the nature of the thing it is intended to govern. Rawls explains that a 
special feature of his constructivist theoretical structure is that it is to be adjusted 
according to the different domains or subjects of justice that the principles ought to 
govern. Domestic justice, international justice, or justice between generations are all 
different domains  Hence the principles adopted will also differ, as the procedure is 
fitted to each problem as they arise. What distinguishes the different subjects is to be 
found in a rather complex passage in A Theory of Justice 
 it is the distinct structure of the social framework, and the purpose and the 
role of its various parts and how they fit together, that explain why there are 
different principles for different subjects. 78  
 
One ought to single out relevant social practices and work from a context through a 
constructivist methodology in order to conclude what are the right principles for the 
practice in question.  
This methodological commitment relies on a substantive claim according to 
which justice is owed in virtue of the social practices and institutions that bind us 
into a common fate. That is, inequality or poverty is not a problem of justice per se; 
they become problematic from a justice point of view only when they are the product 
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of social practices. The role of justice is to provide a common standard through 
which we can justify the rules and norms underlying those shared practices. 
According to the Rawlsian social justice framework, morally arbitrary inequalities do 
not in themselves constitute the problem of justice.79 What Rawls and his followers 
would say is that inequalities are not be “improperly” influenced by morally arbitrary 
factors. What do we mean by improper influence? In Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, Rawls answers his critics explaining very clearly80 why his difference 
principle is not designed to be a redress principle; it is not meant to compensate 
people for their bad luck. Bad luck, or a “natural distribution is neither just nor unjust 
…, these are simply natural facts. What is just or unjust is the way institutions deal 
with these facts.” So, institutions profoundly affect people’s social positions, they 
play a role in determining in part which natural traits they can make good use of and 
which social starting positions will they favor over others, and it is this affect, the 
way institutions deal with natural luck and social starting positions, is what Rawls’ 
principles of justice are intended to regulate. His conception of justice provides a 
standard for the institutions’ permissible effects on people’s social positions and life 
prospects. 
The relevant practice that conditions a conception of distributive justice, in 
Sangiovanni’s view, is the modern nation-state. Why is this relationship relevant for 
justice? He argues that we owe duties of justice to co-citizens and co-residents, given 
our mutual contribution in upholding basic social institutions. This mutual 
contribution transforms into, what he calls, basic state capacity: the basic capacity of 
the state to guarantee for its citizens and residents common social institutions which 
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are necessary for all to pursue their goals. Both citizens and residents are co-
contributors to the well-functioning of this social arrangement, and this contribution, 
according to Sangiovanni, gives all the participants a mutual basis for claims of 
distributive justice upon each other. We mutually contribute to a system that provides 
the necessary conditions to realize our goals in life, for which we owe something in 
return to our fellow contributors.  
What is problematic about the contribution view? Firstly, the contribution 
argument has called forth some of its harshest critiques concerned with the most 
vulnerable groups in society. 81 If actual contributors are the subjects of justice, then 
clearly a wide range of people remain beyond the scope of justice even in a domestic 
setting. Most importantly, children, the severely disabled or entire future generations. 
On a more charitable reading potential contributors (and not actual) might be the 
ones justice is owed to, the circle can be enlarged, but still would exclude those 
whose capacities are insufficient. The case of non-contributors clearly poses a 
problem for the contribution view of social justice, and this applies independently of 
the scope one is arguing for. 
Secondly, I argue that while the contribution argument seems to be doing part 
of the work in grounding the claims of distributive justice, it does not tell us much 
about the boundaries of justice. Recalling Sangiovanni’s claim, basic social 
institutions have a peculiar role, because their effects amount to state capacity that is 
necessary for all to pursue their life plans. In fixing the boundaries, however, too 
much of the argument depends on how one defines the necessary social goods for 
pursuing life-plans. It seems that in order to determine the scope and content of 
justice, we would need to assess which are the basic goods necessary for anyone to 
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carry out their life plan, then to identify which institutional context has the capacity 
to produce it, and finally conclude that, therefore it is the right context for owing a 
fair return. The necessary goods are connected with the nation-state without any 
further argument, assuming that the kind of goods the state provides for its citizens 
are the goods necessary for pursuing our ends. 
 Domestic social institutions clearly play a crucial role in providing necessary 
social goods, such as the constitutional guarantees, property and ownership rules, a 
system of economic production and transfer, or the education system all of which are 
backed up by sanctions and enforcement mechanisms. Our contribution in upholding 
such a scheme, thereby guaranteeing the basis for the life of others, is owed a fair 
return. This is a plausible claim about the reasons for justice, but does this settle he 
problem of scope? Is it really the case that the only relevant context from the social 
goods producing point of view is the nation-state? I take it not. Firstly, because 
nation states are operating in an international context and domestic state capacity, i.e. 
its capacity to produce such relevant social goods, strongly depends on a system of 
international norms and rules.82 Secondly there are certain social goods, the so called 
global public goods, that are necessary social goods for individuals across the globe 
to pursue their life-plans and whose ‘production’ depends on global rules and world-
wide contribution.   
So, what still needs to be explained by Sangiovanni, is the reason why the 
state is the only relevant practice for considerations of justice. The peculiarity of the 
context still needs to be justified. He has showed us why a domestic society seems to 
matter for considerations of justice, because it is a context of mutual contribution. 
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However, he has not shown us that it is the only context where mutual contribution 
gives rise to reciprocal claims.  
 
 
2.3. The Bounded Cooperation View 
 
Samuel Freeman’s view on the ‘boundary problem’ can be reconstructed from the 
passages where he engages with the cosmopolitan challenge to the limited scope 
thesis.83 Freeman first examines the profound effect season, but acknowledges that 
that it will not settle the boundary problem. He argues that many other non-basic 
institutions have pervasive effects on people’s lives, such as religious institutions, 
universities or the media.84  They shape people’s hopes and desires and influence the 
persons they become. One might also object, Freeman says, that in an age of global 
interdependence, global institutions also significantly affect our life prospect. This 
worry seems to be in place. The contribution account might yield a global scope of 
justice, insofar as values attributed to abilities and talents are more and more 
developed in a global society and culture, while their realization and the institutional 
setting for developing them is very much influenced by global market tendencies. So 
what really makes the scheme of fundamental social institutions the distinguished 
subject of justice?  
Freeman argues that the special role reserved for the basic structure is 
inherently connected with another fundamental idea in justice as fairness, namely, 
social cooperation. He argues that basic institutions that make up the basic structure 
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are “essential to social life,” they are “necessary for productive social cooperation, 
and hence for the continued existence of any society.” 85 Social institutions, he 
continues, are necessary for our personal development, especially in fostering our 
two moral powers and social capacities. I take it that Freeman refers here to the role 
of basic institutions in a well-ordered society. Having fulfilled the requirements of 
justice, they play an essential role in the development of moral powers, and in the 
education of citizen’s self-conception as free and equal persons.  
 Freeman further argues in order to justify the social and global discrepancy. 
According to him, while global cooperation clearly has benefits, what social 
cooperation provides us with, are the essential attribute of being human: language, 
reason, and morality. That is, in his view, the breakdown of global cooperation 
would only lead to insignificant economic and cultural losses from trade, and we 
could do well without it as we did for centuries before. However, as he says, if social 
cooperation collapsed, we would loose something morally significant, civilization 
itself.86. It seems that Freeman is providing an account of what makes human beings 
essentially human, followed by an empirical argument concerning the type of the 
institutions that foster these human capacities. To sum up, the reason Freeman brings 
into play is that social cooperation is “central to who and what we are,” hence the 
limited application of principles of justice to a single society, and not further. 
 Freeman points out in several places a third, and most convincing, reason that 
might settle the boundary problem. Rawlsian social cooperation is often understood, 
by cosmopolitan scholars, as an institutionally mediated social and economic 
engagement. Given the fact of economic globalization social cooperation gains 
global relevance, hence an extension of the scope of justice must follow. Freeman 
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insists, however, that “trade alone or causal influences of consumption patterns on 
other people do not amount to social cooperation.”87 Basic social institutions are 
political products, embedded in a legal-political framework, whose power is derived 
from the public will of a bounded constituency. As he says, Rawls “transforms the 
problem of distributive justice …. into the problem of political design of basic social 
institutions,” working out standards for assessing and designing those institutions.88 
Rawlsian distributive justice, on Freeman’s account is grounded in the idea of social 
and political cooperation. It seems to me, however, that the reason which Freeman 
explores for justifying the limited scope thesis through social cooperation, essentially 
falls back to the argument from political cooperation. Or, we might say, social 
cooperation, in his view, is essentially political.  
 
 
2.4. The Bounded Constituency View 
 
 On the bounded constituency view members of a political association, and 
only them, owe each other egalitarian distributive duties, based on the idea that its 
members are participants in a legally grounded political system of self-legislation, 
and they are co-authors of coercive laws through which they mutually determine 
each others’ fates. The domestic basic structure is the relevant context of justice 
insofar as it is the only domain of human associations, currently available to us, in 
which we can exercise legitimate political authority over each others' life. The 
position is ascribed to Thomas Nagel, who has firstly articulated such a challenge to 
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egalitarian accounts of global justice, limiting his analysis to  constitutional liberal 
democracies. 
In his article “The Problem of Global Justice”89 Nagel has put forward a 
serious challenge for advocates of global justice. Perhaps the most controversial 
about his view is his conclusion, according to which global poverty is “not a matter 
of justice.”90 This conclusion is especially striking for those 800 million people 
currently suffering from lack of food, shelter, hygienic condition or access to life-
saving medicine. Assuming away the element of justice from their plight is a serious 
charge with grave consequences. In order to clarify this claim, one must open up the 
implicit assumptions behind Nagel’s thesis, thereby making the conclusion less 
troubling than it would seem for the first sight. How must we understand that this 
enormous suffering worldwide is “not a matter of justice”? On what grounds can 
Nagel claim away the element of justice from our relations to people living in 
extreme poverty worldwide? 
In defense of Nagel, let me first qualify his statement. First, what he means 
by “justice as ordinarily understood” is social justice as egalitarian concern, 
commonly understood within the Rawlsian tradition.91 Second, what is or is not a 
matter of justice very much depends on the particular conception of justice one 
endorses. Nagel seems to be endorsing an institutional conception of justice, 
strengthened with the idea of a democratic political association of self-legislating 
individuals. On his view, principles of justice provide a standard for justifying to 
each other the terms of our political association, through which we exercise power 
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over each others’ life, hence the duty of justice is owed to those together with whom 
we establish and maintain such political institutional ties. So Nagel’s conclusion 
reformulated with the help of these qualifications goes as follows. The problem of 
global poverty, then, is not a matter of egalitarian distributive justice grounded in an 
institutional conception of justice, qualified as the institutional scheme of legitimate 
political authority.  
The above clarification allows us to better understand Nagel’s conclusion and 
to assess his discrepancy thesis between social and global justice. It is a dualist or, as 
he calls it, a “multilayered” conception of morality, according to which social justice 
among fellow citizens is one thing and global justice among fellow human beings is 
another. They are two different duties that rest on different normative grounds and 
incorporate different normative requirements. Nagel argues that we have universal 
ties to all human beings from which general duties of political justice can be derived. 
Beyond such general duties to all, we also have special obligations to our fellow 
citizens such as distributive or economic justice. That is, the objection to human 
rights violations and the critical assessment of socio-economic inequalities are 
derived from different moral sources; the former being a universal duty while the 
latter is a special institutional duty among fellow countrymen.92   
 Egalitarian social justice, according to Nagel, is about justifying our 
institutional scheme of legitimate political authority that exercises control over our 
lives, and the duty is owed to the putative joint authors of the laws that constitute 
such a scheme.  The relations that fall outside this category will be morally assessed 
through another normative category: a humanitarian moral minimum. He then claims 
that until there is not a similar institutional scheme at the global level through which 
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we can exercise legitimate political authority over each others’ fate across the globe, 
world poverty is not a matter of justice, but a matter of humanitarian assistance, 
which guarantees a minimum level of decent living for all human beings. He does 
not provide us with a normative account grounding the duty and specifying its 
requirements. One might, however, think of Rawls’ account of a natural duty, which 
is a kind of duty owed prior to and independent of the institutional relations and the 
social practices that bind us together. “They obtain between all as equal moral 
persons.”93 Mutual aid is one such duty, and it requires us to help “another when he is 
in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to 
oneself.”94 Similarly to Rawls’ natural duty account Nagel holds that humanitarian 
assistance is a general duty we owe to all human beings dire poverty and need, 
independently of global institutional arrangements. It is a global sufficientarian 
position, insofar as he points out that the duty is discharged once the group suffering 
has reached a level of decency, so the duty has a  threshold, a cut-off point  Both the 
grounding and the requirements of humanitarian assistance is rather vague on 
Nagel’s account. He is not so interested in specifying the natural duty as much as 
drawing a conceptual distinction between egalitarian justice and a humanitarian 
moral minimum, and more importantly, a distinction between the different reasons 
grounding the two types of duties, in order to show why the scope of egalitarian 
distributive justice is domestic. 
Having understood Nagel’s dualist account of the duty of justice, 
characterized by institutional egalitarian justice within our state borders and 
sufficientarian humanitarian assistance outside our political association, let us now 
scrutinize the more profound reasons grounding his domestic account. What justifies 
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Nagel’s discrepancy thesis between the requirements of domestic and global justice? 
How can he tie down the duty of distributive justice in basic structure of a nation 
state, and there alone? Why are claims of justice only conceivable within a 
democratic nation-state? A fundamental tenet of Rawlsian political philosophy is that 
morally arbitrary inequalities do not in themselves constitute the problem of justice.95 
The challenge of social justice is that inequalities are not be “improperly” influenced 
by morally arbitrary factors. The substantive criterion of permissible inequalities is 
incorporated into Rawls two principles of justice that are worked out through the 
theoretical device of the original position. How the substantive theory works is less 
important for us now, than understanding that what ought to be justified according to 
this conception is the way institutions channel the morally arbitrary sources into 
unequal life-prospects in a society.   
Why is this requirement of special justification for our shared institutional 
scheme hold only among fellow citizens, on Nagel’s view?  In a first formulation 
Nagel argues that special justification is owed in the case of domestic institutions 
because they exercise “comprehensive control over the framework of their citizens’ 
lives.”96 This echoes the classical Rawlsian tenet, according to which the basic 
structure has a profound effect on people’s life prospects. The claim that social 
institutions profoundly affect our social positions and life-prospects, and hence their 
moral assessment, the rules according to which such a distribution occurs must be the 
first instance of a theory of justice. This is a clearly an argument for the basic 
structure as primary subject of justice, but does it tell us much about the scope of 
justice, though? In order for the pervasive effect reason to yield the boundaries of 
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justice, one must be able to show that there are certain institutions with a domestic 
scope that pervasively affect our lives while other institutions with global or local 
scope less important in their effect on our social positions. There are many types of 
institutions that affect our lives, some of them domestic in their reach, others are 
global, again others manifest their effects in our local surroundings. Besides the so 
called domestic basic structure, comprising the fundamental legal and political 
institutions, the economic system, the educational system and the family, at the 
supra-national level, international institutions regulating trade and finance, global 
agreements concerning the environment, the patenting of life-saving drugs, 
determining the future of natural resources and public services have incremental 
effects on our lives and provide the framework of our everyday choices, despite the 
fact that often we are often not aware of their concrete effects. If the pervasive effect 
reason were to tie down the scope of justice, then it is possible to show why we 
might owe justification to people on the other side of the planet whose life-prospects 
are affected through the working of international rules and institutions.97 I argue, 
then, that the pervasive effect reason does not seem to capture what is normatively 
peculiar about social institutions, it only tells us why we should focus on institutions 
and their effects in our moral assessment. Furthermore, if it were the only triggering 
reason for distributive concerns, provided that a strong empirical case can be made 
for global institutions affecting peoples’ lives all over the world, it might well yield a 
global scope. 
So what gives basic social institutions such a morally distinguished place? 
Why do their effects require special justification, while the other type of institutions 
do not? Nagel complements the pervasive effect reason with a further condition. So 
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while institutionally mediated mutual affectedness is a necessary condition for the 
problem of social justice to arise, any kind of institution will not be enough to 
support the claim to distributive justice. He qualifies the kind of institutions for 
which we owe each other distributive justification in the following way. “What is 
objectionable is that we should be fellow participants in a collective enterprise of 
coercively imposed legal and political institutions that generate such arbitrary 
inequalities.”98  
The key is to be found in the idea of “collective enterprise of coercively 
imposed … institutions” where at least two different cases can be made, depending 
on our focus:  collective enterprise, or the coercively imposed component. Which of 
the two provides us with sufficient reasons to demand justification through a 
standard of social justice?  
Let us start first examine whether the coercive imposition of rules is a good 
enough reason to confine justice to the domestic context. At a first glance what is 
objectionable when examining the normative apparatus behind legal and political 
state institutions is the coercive imposition of norms. Coercion can be understood in 
two ways. First, it can be understood as a capacity of the coercer for ‘getting people 
to do things.’ Second, it can also be understood as a reason for the coerced to comply 
with rules. Taking the first sense, the capacity of the state to coerce, would imply that 
we are owed justification because the state apparatus has its own law-enforcing 
mechanism such as local police forces and exclusive command over the army. It 
would be an easy way to dismiss global institutions as subjects of justice, clearly not 
having the traditional enforcement mechanisms in place. An authoritative regime has 
the capacity to coerce us to do certain things, this in itself however, does not give us 
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a sufficient reason to demand justification for the rule it imposes on us. What is 
lacking in these cases is exactly our normative grip on the system, the moral ground 
on which the system lies on.  
So clearly, if coercion is the morally relevant feature of the basic structure, 
the justice triggering element lies in the reasons we have to comply with the law. 
Our compliance rests on the recognition of the right kind of coercion, i.e. legitimate 
political authority exercised over our lives.99  So what is normatively relevant about 
the basic structure is that it exercises legitimate political authority over our lives The 
reason why we that the state owes us justification for the rules it imposes on us is 
because at its normative foundation lies the claim of legitimacy, i.e. that it imposes 
those rules in our name. So, the act of political authorization gives us sufficient 
grounds for demanding justification for the laws that bind us into a common fate.  In 
Nagel’s words “the putative joint authorship” (cit) of the terms of our institutions that 
gives us standing to demand justification for the burdens it imposes on us. “…we are 
expected to accept their authority even when the collective decision diverges from 
our personal preferences …”100 So as co-authors of those coercive rules through 
which we mutually determine each other’s social position, we owe and we are owed 
justification for the kind of rules we impose on one another. In Nagel’s words, 
given that [the state] exercises sovereign power over its citizens and in their 
name, those citizens have a duty of justice toward one another through the 
legal social and economic institutions that sovereign power makes 
possible.101 
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Distributive justice extends only to our co-citizens, the relevant constituency 
in a state, given that persons belonging to that group are the only ones who are 
both authors and subjects of the rules at the same time.  
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CHAPTER III 
______________________________________________________ 
 
Justification: Global, Public and Egalitarian 
 
3.1. Justifying Global Egalitarianism  
 
In this chapter I make an inquiry into the appropriate form of justification a global 
egalitarian conception requires. Global egalitarianism has been most notably justified 
through an extension of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, grounded in Kantian liberalism. 
I challenge this view, by showing why such an extension is insufficiently justified to 
a global public, and why global egalitarianism must be justified on public grounds, 
rather than drawing on a specific comprehensive doctrine, often ascribed to the 
Enlightment tradition of the West. Drawing on Rawls’ political conception of justice 
in his Political Liberalism, I explain why the appropriate way to justify principles 
under conditions of moral and religious pluralism is reasoning from political ideals 
embedded in the public culture of a society. Then, I proceed by demonstrating that 
public justification ought to be taken seriously not only in the domestic case, but 
even more so in the global case, due to a rich diversity of moral and religious 
doctrines characterizing the international public sphere. I argue that global 
egalitarianism, in order for it to be consistently egalitarian, must rest on an 
egalitarian theory of justification, which I term, justificatory egalitarianism. 
Justificatory egalitarianism is a form of justification that treats people as 
equals in the relevant sense, namely as equally valid sources of moral claims. Under 
conditions of global pluralism, it requires us to rest our justificatory argument on 
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global public grounds, to reason from global public ideals that could be shared, 
thereby offering justification the relevant others could not reasonable reject. A global 
conception of justice has to appeal to those global agents the justification is 
addressed to and whose actions are to be guided by the principles of justice. Global 
egalitarianism, if it aims to be egalitarian all the way down, must rest its justificatory 
argument on global public grounds.  
 
3.2. Rawlsian Constructivism: Moral vs. Political 102 
 
In moral and political theorizing, constructivism is a thesis about the objectivity of 
principles. In general, constructivism is the claim that normative principles are 
objective insofar as they are the outcome of a suitably specified procedure of 
construction, and not because they refer to some order of moral truths independent of 
moral agents and prior to political institutions. So conceived, constructivism opposes 
moral realism (the claim that judgments are true of an independent moral order), 
skepticism (according to which there are no truth conditions for normative 
statements) and relativism (the view that there are no objective moral standards, or 
universally valid principles). Constructivists claim to do this through a suitably 
specified method of justification. 
This method of justification is based on a procedural approach that takes 
agents from un-constructed elements (such as the conceptions of persons and society 
and the role of a conception of political morality) to constructed normative 
principles. Constructivism can do without controversial metaphysical assumptions 
because it is a pure procedural approach. Indeed, it does not require any ex-ante 
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criterion of justification, but only the correct application of a fair procedure, which 
responds to the relevant facts (subjective and objective circumstances of justice103) 
and embeds all the requirements of practical reasoning. The fairness of this 
procedure will be transferred from the premises to the outcomes. Consequently, 
whatever is constructed by a suitably conceived procedure (as the original position) 
has to be regarded as justified. In this way, constructivists can aim at a conception of 
objectivity as robust as moral realism, but holding the same metaphysically 
parsimony of non-cognitivist approaches (such as skepticism and relativism). 
Now, what kind of procedure can accomplish this task? Rawls famously 
thinks that principles governing the basic institutions of a society are best accounted 
for as a choice of hypothetical agents under the suitably specified constraints of the 
so-called “original position.” The denizens of this initial choice situation are 
deprived of knowledge of their social status and natural abilities, hence equally 
situated in order to choose principles that could be accepted by all. The original 
position is an ideal situation where social and economic differences are hidden by a 
veil of ignorance, since they depend on mere social luck, and so irrelevant from a 
moral point of view. Under these constraints, Rawls argues, agents of construction 
would choose principles guaranteeing equal basic liberties and equality of 
opportunity, and a principle that allows for inequalities only if they are not 
detrimental to the worst off in society. 
What makes the original position the correct procedural device in the choice 
of the principles? Since the rightness of the initial assumptions transfers to the 
rightness of the principles, the stakes involved in the setup of the choice situation are 
high. Given that the procedure is not itself constructed, but it is rather “laid out” from 
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grounding elements, it constitutes the suitable viewpoint insofar as it incorporates the 
right grounding elements.  The overall conception stands or falls on these grounding 
elements. Therefore, they are to be considered as the essentials of the theoretical 
structure. The grounding elements, as Rawls says, are neither “ethically neutral” nor 
“self-evident;” nevertheless he urges us to accept them to be “widely recognized as 
reasonable” conditions on the rational choice of the principles. 
In both TJ and PL, the grounding elements are the conceptions of person and 
society, and the role of a conception of justice. Persons are characterized as having 
two moral powers, namely a capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to have, 
form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. The role played by a conception 
of justice is to provide a public basis of justification in a society marked my 
permanent disagreement about moral and political views. So conceived, principles 
are not derived from an independent order of moral values; rather, they are 
constructed out of these grounding elements. For this reason, Rawls labels his 
justificatory method as constructivist. But while in TJ Rawls makes reference to a 
liberal comprehensive view, in PL he draws on implicitly shared values present in 
the public political life of a democratic society. Indeed, in the later works, his aim is 
to come up with a political conception of justice that could possibly be accepted by 
adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which are the many religious and 
philosophical beliefs characterizing a complex society. 
Depending on the kind of society and the relevant agents for whom the 
principles are to provide a public basis of justification, the suitability of the 
viewpoint from which the objectivity of the principles derives, is supported in a 
different way. The source for suitability changes according to the task of political 
theorizing in question. While in TJ the task is to work out a conception of justice that 
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can be accepted by essentially liberal moral agents, PL aims at a practicable political 
conception justifiable to the citizens of a pluralistic society. In short, it is possible to 
maintain that while the content of a conception justice remains the same, a shift in 
the source for the grounding elements occurs, which results in a discrepancy between 
the objectivity of the principles in question. 
As said, Rawls presents two versions of constructivism. The first version, 
namely moral constructivism, is presented as a comprehensive moral doctrine. It 
claims that the only source of our moral values is the activity of practical reason and 
nothing else. Moral constructivism is the claim that 
the order of moral and political values must be made, or itself constituted, by 
the principles and conceptions of practical reason […] by the activity, actual 
or ideal, of practical (human) reason itself.104 
 
In this way, Rawls aims at establishing a shared basis of discussion and 
agreement in a genuinely liberal framework, where members of a political 
community can justify to each other principles regulating their affairs without 
invoking any superior authority. In other words, these principles are not imposed 
upon them from an external (or heteronomous) source. Principles of justice are the 
outcome of a deliberative process among free and equal citizens of a democratic 
society. In this way, principles can be considered as autonomously selected. Even if 
liberal, this approach falls short when we face the fact of pluralism, namely the fact 
that people disagree about how we ought to live and, more problematically, how we 
ought to live together. Political constructivism, the other variety presented by Rawls, 
addresses this question. Indeed, it is presented as a non-comprehensive view. It 
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admits that our moral values can have different sources, and not necessarily practical 
reason. So, political constructivism 
represents, or displays, the order of political values as based on principles of 
practical reason in union with the appropriate political conceptions of society 
and person.105 
 
Now, how is this political understanding of constructivism different from the 
moral one? In both moral and political constructivism, Rawls refers to the role of 
practical reason. The point is that in the case of political constructivism, the claim is 
more modest than in the moral version. Indeed, while moral constructivism claims 
that only practical reason “constitutes” or creates the order of moral values (to which 
we refer in our practical decisions), political constructivism 
accepts the view that the principles of practical reason originate, if we insist 
on saying they originate anywhere, in our moral consciousness as informed 
by practical reason. They derive from nowhere else. […] Still, accepting this, 
it is a separate question whether the principles of practical reason constitute 
the order of values.106 
 
Now, if principles of justice originate from practical reason, but practical 
reason does not constitute the order of values, where do these values come from? 
How can we address this question on constructivist grounds? To this aim, it might be 
helpful to distinguish between what one could call the “origin” of a conception of 
justice and its justification. According to Rawls, political philosophy should serve the 
aim of establishing a public standard for adjudicating conflicting claims of justice.107 
This undertaking entails a practical conception of justification (rather than a 
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theoretical one), since its aim is not related to the knowledge of objects but to 
working out principles of justice. The philosophical work to be carried out, on this 
practical interpretation, is to provide a suitable point of view for adjudicating 
conflicting moral claims. The suitability of this point of view makes the case for the 
objectivity of the conception of justice. In TJ, Rawls claims that a conception of 
justice is objective when it issues universally valid norms, namely norms that apply 
to all members of society and that all can accept. In PL, while the justificatory 
strategy remains the same (principles are justified and, therefore objective, if they 
can be accounted for as outcome of a suitably specified procedure), what generates 
demands of justices varies. For moral constructivists, practical reason originates 
moral values or (at least) requirements of justice. Political constructivism, instead, 
“leaves open (‘brackets’) philosophical questions about the real origins of moral 
principles and their ultimate epistemic status.”108 On Rawls’s view, a political 
conception of justice allows that the sources of normativity can be found in some 
deity’s commands, in the nature of things, in our emotional response to states of 
affairs, in some utility function, and so forth. In other words, it takes seriously the 
fact of pluralism. What bearing does this bracketing the origins have on the 
objectivity of principles? 
For better understanding the shift from moral to political constructivism, and 
the bearing of it on our theorizing about justice, we need to focus on the elements out 
of which the theorists constructs principles of justice, and in what sense they 
constitute the appropriate starting point for theorizing. 
As said, according to constructivists principles of justice are justified if they 
can be accounted for as the outcome of a suitably specified procedure of 
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construction. Recall that a procedure constructing normative principles is given to 
the theory, and it is not itself constructed (as Rawls says, it is “laid out”). A 
procedure is the theoretical device that leads from un-constructed elements to 
constructed principles. So, what are these un-constructed elements that constitute the 
material of construction? 
The fundamental conceptions that Rawls takes as theoretical starting points 
for laying out his procedural device of representation are concerned with how we 
ideally conceive of ourselves (ideal conception of the person), and how we might 
come to understand, at a very basic level, the goal and purpose of our society 
(fundamental organizing idea of society). In “Kantian Constructivism,” Rawls 
presents this conception of the person as a model conception that expresses our self-
understanding as free and equal moral persons. Rawls proposes this account of the 
person ideally construed as a reflection on the values present in our public life. 
This conception of the person is further supported by another ideal 
conception, that of a society as we ourselves understand it. The relevant features of a 
person are selected with the help of a more fundamental core idea of a society. Once 
we have a grasp on what is a society, at the highest level of generality, we can 
conclude what are the most important features of persons that take part in such a 
society. This fundamental idea of society that he takes to be an uncontroversial 
starting point for political constructivism is “a fair system of social cooperation over 
time, from one generation to the next.” Rawls describes this idea as “the fundamental 
organizing idea of justice as fairness, within which the other basic ideas are 
systematically connected.” Three characteristics are crucial. First, a social 
cooperation is distinct from any coordinated action due to the rules and procedure it 
involves.  Second, its members offer each other fair terms. His point is that in social 
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cooperation, people conceive of the rules of cooperation as fair, and do not think of 
them as simply based on a compromise according to each person’s power or threat 
advantage. Third, every member has an idea of his or her ends rationally pursued. 
This is a basic idea of society that Rawls takes for granted. However, what fairness 
entails, what its fair terms might involve, must be given a specific content. It is the 
role of a conception of justice to specify the fair terms of social cooperation.109 
In his early writings, Rawls theory is meant to address the problem of just 
institutions in a liberal democracy, where some political values, such as liberty and 
equality, are somehow already shared. This means that their sources are not to be 
considered in some external authority (such as a deity or some moral belief endowed 
of some special philosophical status), but in the same persons taking part to the 
society. So, the philosophical project carried out in TJ is to prove his conception of 
justice as fairness to be a better alternative compared to other political philosophical 
views. In order to do this, Rawls deploys many argumentative strategies, among 
which constructivism.110 Roughly, Rawls is trying to show that in a genuine liberal 
society individuals are to be considered as “self originating sources of valid claims.” 
Other approaches to the question of justice (such as rational intuitionism, which 
move from some self-evident premises) are highly problematic on a philosophical 
level. Moreover, they will contrast his Kantian project of a conception of political 
morality based on the idea of autonomy. Indeed, theories of justice grounded on 
ideals that are independent of persons and prior to social institutions are 
heteronomous. For a real autonomous view, persons, provided with the two moral 
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powers, are the sources of normativity. Or, in more Kantian terms, practical reason 
generates our moral values. 
Later on, Rawls comes to recognize that a Kantian interpretation is too 
demanding when we face the problem of pluralism. As already said in the 
introduction, our societies are characterized by profound disagreement concerning 
the way we ought to live together.  Due to enduring conflict upon different moral 
views, a strictly liberal conception of justice based on a comprehensive ideal 
(namely, Kantian autonomy) would unlikely be justifiable in a society so conceived. 
The possibility of implementing a comprehensive liberal ideal in a society marked by 
reasonable pluralism would involve serious moral costs. For a social arrangement 
based on a comprehensive justification is most likely to lead to oppression over time, 
and therefore unfeasible. 
Now, what seems to be the major difficulty is to find an appropriate starting 
point, a fundamental idea that is more or less uncontroversial despite our deep 
disagreements. In light of this fact of pluralism, in order to find “starting points that 
are mutually recognized,” the philosopher needs to refer to those minimally shared 
understandings within public life, the locus of which is to be found in our political 
institutions and in their widely shared interpretations. The political philosopher’s 
task, in other words, is to properly identify the shared values embedded in those 
institutions and understand what principles they lead to. “Society’s main institutions 
and their accepted forms of interpretation are seen as a fund of implicitly shared 
ideas and principles”111 This fund of shared ideas seems to be the only possible 
starting point in reasoning about justice for a society characterized by deep moral and 
religious cleavages. The basic idea of the society and the accompanying conception 
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of the person are at the highest level of generality representations of those shared 
values. 
While in TJ it received little attention, from his Dewey Lectures onward 
(1980) Rawls makes it more explicit that he is pursuing his political philosophy with 
a practical purpose. According to him, the work of the philosopher, “the work of 
abstraction” is not a pure conceptual concern, but it is “set in motion by deep 
political conflicts.”112 Abstraction is not carried out for abstraction’s sake, but it 
serves the purpose of public discussion insofar as its aim is to point to what could be 
accepted as a basis for reasoning in public. When what counts as sufficient or 
insufficient reason for justification is itself the object of contestation is when political 
philosophy is called for. Rawls’s theoretical quest for the appropriate basis of 
criticism is put in service of reducing practical political disagreement or at least in 
service of a continued public discussion when agreement is out of sight. 
The aim of political conception of justice “practical, not metaphysical” or 
epistemological.113 The traditionally important task of political philosophy, that is, 
finding the best conception of justice for the best possible world becomes secondary, 
if not irrelevant for Rawls. The question is not whether we could conceive of just 
society starting from scratch. The question is whether we can work out from where 
we stand, from the society in which we live in, a criterion for evaluating the justice 
of our historically evolved social institutions. Hence, Rawls takes the “real task” of 
the political philosopher to be the construction of “a social point of view that all can 
accept,” a conception of justice “that all can live with.” 
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3.3. The Political Turn: Prudential vs. Moral Considerations 
 
Critiques of the Rawlsian political turn have voiced their concern about grounding 
principles of justice in public ideals embedded in the political culture of a society.  
G.A. Cohen has forcefully argued that facts in themselves cannot ground principles 
of justice. “There is always an explanation why a ground grounds what is grounds.”  
That is, there must always be a further consideration that makes those facts relevant 
in a justification. According to Cohen, “it is always a further principle that confers on 
a fact its principle grounding power.”  The moral considerations that support a 
certain justificatory strategy over another, when systematically worked out, amount 
to a normative theory of justification.  My aim here is to point out how Rawls’ 
selection criteria for public justification reveal more profound liberal and egalitarian 
commitments. These commitments, which together amount to the normative theory 
of public justification, select pluralism as a relevant constraint, and public culture to 
be the appropriate starting point for reasoning about justice. 
There are, at least, four different considerations supporting the political turn 
as the appropriate response to the fact of pluralism: 1.) the liberal commitment of not 
coercing people into holding our own views; 2.) treating people as equals in their 
relevant beliefs and offering them justification on terms they can accept; 3.) 
publicity; 4.) the meta-theoretical commitment towards justice as a practicable 
conception, as a ‘view from somewhere.’ I discuss these four considerations briefly.  
P1: Non-coercion. The principle that confers on the fact of pluralism its 
reason giving status, is the liberal commitment, according to which it is wrong to 
impose our moral views on other people. Our prior commitment to non-coercion 
makes pluralism a relevant fact. If this underlying meta-commitment was not present, 
 84 
and if coercing people into believing our (liberal) truth is what we were after, then 
the fact of pluralism would not be a relevant fact. Conversely, if we lived in a 
doctrinally homogeneous society, then a non-coercion principle would not select the 
‘fact of homogeneity’ as a relevant fact, since given such a fact about society, the 
problem of disagreement does not occur.”  
P2: Reasonable justification. Treating people as equals requires that we 
justify our views to them on terms they can reasonably accept. Offering reasonable 
justification to others is exactly what offering fair terms of cooperation entails. While 
promoting what we believe is the ‘truly just’ way to organize social institutions is the 
most rational thing for us to do from a first person perspective, given that our 
practical reason operates in a social space, the second person perspective, what is 
reasonable for other to accept (not to reject) must be taken into consideration. 
Why is this justification of political principles to others so relevant? One way 
to respond is by saying that justifying principles to others on terms they can 
reasonably accept or cannot reasonably reject is the essence of treating people as 
equals. Offering others justification, a specific kind of justification that is meaningful 
to them, concerning the basic norms of our social arrangement, is motivated by our 
deepest egalitarian concern, concern for the equal moral and public status of persons.   
P3: Publicity. 
P4: Practicability (justice as the ‘view from somewhere’) What seems to be 
making pluralism a relevant fact (i.e. the ground that grounds the ground) is the idea 
that justice is to be a workable or practicable idea, it is to play a social role in a 
society. Through this assumption, Rawls redefines the task of political philosophy 
together with the role of a conception of justice in society. The quest of a Rawlsian 
political philosophy is not whether we could conceive of the best conception of 
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justice for the best possible world, starting from scratch. The question is whether we 
can work out from where we stand, from here and now, a criterion for evaluating the 
justice of our historically evolved social institutions. Hence, Rawls takes the “real 
task” of the political philosopher to be the construction of “a social point of view that 
all can accept,” a conception of justice “that all can live with.”  Reasoning about 
justice is rooted in our society and in our time, it starts from moral ideals congenial 
to a profound understanding of ourselves. A Rawls says, is a ‘view from somewhere’ 
not a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel). The requirement that a conception of justice 
must be a view from somewhere is the grounding consideration for Rawls’ principles 
of justice. If justice is to have a social role, if it is to provide a common viewpoint for 
adjudicating conflicting claims and make mutually acceptable the terms of our basic 
arrangements, then pluralism will be a relevant constraint and public culture will be 
the appropriate starting point for reasoning about justice. 
 
 
3.4. Public Justification: A Defense 
 
As we have seen, the kind of justification appropriate to offer to others must start by 
premises that can be mutually recognized by the relevant others. If it is so, then the 
fact of reasonable pluralism poses a real challenge to justification. The major 
difficulty is to find an appropriate starting point that is more or less uncontroversial 
despite our deep religious and philosophical disagreements. Comprehensive 
philosophical views, such as Rawls’ Kantian Constructivism, cannot serve its 
justificatory role in a pluralist society, insofar as the underlying premise, most 
importantly the relation between personhood and autonomy, are likely to be rejected 
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by many. We can anticipate from a first person-perspective that the reasons that we 
are offering to others are likely to be no reasons for them at all. However, as Rawls 
argues, these controversial foundational questions might be bracketed in a 
justificatory argument. Putting aside philosophical controversies about moral truth, 
Rawls identifies the public political culture as an appropriate source for reasoning 
about justice. We might call this the political turn114 in the Rawlsian theory of 
justification, according to which, the appropriate way to justify principles of justice 
under conditions of pluralism is by resting the argument on “fundamental ideas latent 
in the public political culture.” As noted by many, this is an important sense in which 
Rawls’ conception of justice is political: in its method or source.115 What makes a 
method of justification political or public is that it rests on a public source.  
Some welcomed Rawls’ political conception of justice as ‘epistemic 
humility,’  or as well-founded ‘epistemic restraint,’ others rejected it as ‘epistemic 
abstinence,’  or liberal skepticism, wile still others took it to be a move towards 
grounding principles of justice in historically contingent facts qua facts alone. I argue 
that Rawls’ turn towards public justification neither amounts to founding principles 
of justice on contingent facts alone, nor is it a mere prudential concern with the 
practicality and stability of justice. Rawls’ political turn can be interpreted as 
motivated by a deep meta-theoretical commitment: a concern with the kind of 
justification that is appropriate under conditions of reasonable pluralism. Before 
turning to the moral defense of public justification, however, let me consider two 
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kinds of skepticism about public justification, both of which can be labeled as a 
charge of conservatism or status quo bias. 
Objection 1: Status Quo Bias. If reasoning about justice starts from public 
culture, the principles only reaffirm what people already believe and what is the 
dominant view in a society. This criticism comes in two different formulations. The 
first takes public culture to be a sort of public opinion, focusing on people’s actual 
beliefs. I will call this the actual assent thesis, borrowing the term from Gerald Gaus. 
The second, instead (I think more accurately), takes public culture to be our 
historically developed institutions and their shared interpretations. I will call this the 
institutional status quo thesis. 
a) The actual assent thesis (moral satisficing charge) holds that a moral 
demand is publicly justified if, and only if, the relevant others have given their actual 
assent to it. But does the fact that some people do not assent to a certain moral 
demand prove that public justification has failed? People can withhold their assent 
for several reasons. And only one of those reasons is the conviction that the demand 
is unjustified and unconvincing. Hence, actual assent, Gaus argues, does not seem to 
be necessary for a principle to be publicly justified. The actual assent thesis seems to 
suggest that what a justifier is interested in is people’s actual beliefs, and wants to 
match her principles to the ordinary capacities of ordinary people. If this were the 
case, then normative theorizing would loose critical footing, and it would amount to 
some sort of moral satisficing. The aim of normative theorizing would be to satisfy 
the actual moral sensibilities of persons, instead of challenging it and critically 
guiding people towards moral progress. Surely this is not a good notion of normative 
theorizing. 
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For a better notion of normative theorizing, notice the distinction between 
what people can accept, and what people could accept (see section1). Moral 
satisficing would only be the case if we took an appropriate notion of justification to 
be offering reasons that people can accept. Taking persons’ capacities to be whatever 
they actually are. This is, however, not our preferred notion of justification. I have 
claimed that proper justification involves what people could accept. Moving from 
can to could involves idealizing assumptions that the justifier is making concerning 
the potential addressees of her theory. The notion of the idealized addressee that 
Rawls offers us is the, so called, reasonable person. The other person’s assent can 
only be the test of justified principles if the person to whom justification is addressed 
to is reasoning according to her best capacity and in good faith.116 (considered 
judgments, not pre-theoretical judgment, cool hour reasoning). A proper notion of 
justification works with an ideal of persons in their best capacity to reason and 
engage with others, and see whether the justification we advance could be accepted 
by them on due reflection or not.  
It is not actual agreement that public justification relies on, but an ideal, a 
stipulated agreement on political values, which serves as the basis of a hypothetical 
argument. The public justificatory argument goes: if you can accept the premises I 
am offering to you, as I am assuming you can as a participating citizen in a 
democratic society, then the reason I am offering must be meaningful for you. 
b) The institutional status quo thesis objects to public justification with a 
slightly different charge of conservatism. Roughly, the argument runs as follows. 
Whatever values and institutions have developed historically cannot be a good basis 
of justification, because normative theory would only reaffirm and strengthen the 
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historical status quo. Justice would require what justice already is. One might 
respond that starting from the same set of core values there is more than one way to 
organize social institutions. Freedom and equality as fundamental democratic 
commitments are vague and their institutional embodiment is indeterminate. There 
are many ways to work out such values into principles of justice. Starting from core 
values, and working them out systematically into a coherent set of principles, we can 
develop a critical point of view to assess in what sense those institutions, as they are 
actually organized, fulfill the requirements of justice. Consequently, starting from 
public ideals one can arrive to develop a critical point of view. This answer might 
save public justification from its strictly conservative implications. But what if the 
ideals themselves (and not only their institutional embodiment) that our human 
history has left us with are simply wrong or bad. Surely working out a theory of 
justice in times of slavery or under Nazism, cannot involve starting from 
discriminatory norms or institutional practices that deprive certain groups of their 
dignity or humanness. There is a sense in which public justification has to meet a 
threshold in the ideas that it takes for granted. It cannot start from any idea or any 
dominant view but it has to start from ideals. In other words, it cannot start with what 
we, in fact, value but what we have good reason to value. Putting the problem of 
good and bad ideas aside for a moment, assuming that our premises meet that 
threshold, what is important about them is that they are ideals for us. We start from 
public ideals embedded in the political culture not because these ideals are 
necessarily true (in the metaphysical sense), but because they embody our self-
understanding and our core commitment to society as a fair system of social 
cooperation. 
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Once I have clarified that public justification neither amounts to meeting the 
dominant view in society, nor to reaffirming existing institutional arrangements, 
thereby rebutting two of the most often raised challenges, I take on the moral defense 
of public justification.  
The basic idea of public justification is: to reason publicly is to reason from 
the standpoint of others. As Gerald Gaus says,  
“Because we can distinguish personal from public reason, we can address 
arguments to others in the sense that we can provide reasons to them – 
considerations that are reasons given their own systems of beliefs.”117  
 
“Justifying your beliefs or principles to others does not involve simply 
giving others reasons that they will accept, but in some way advancing 
reasons that you think are good reasons for them to accept.”118 
 
Justifying principles on public grounds does not amount to identifying a core set of 
minimal public morality as a sort of lowest common denominator among the 
plurality of values, in order to convince everyone. This would be a mere prudential 
consideration for moving from a comprehensive justification to public justification. 
The moral argument for the political turn runs somewhat deeper. Offering reasons 
that the others could accept from where they stand, is the most fundamental sense in 
which we can treat people as equals. Our concern with treating others as equals in 
the kind of justification that we offer them is the guiding idea behind taking 
pluralism seriously. Offering others justification that is meaningful to them, 
concerning the basic norms of our social arrangement, is motivated by our deepest 
egalitarian concern, concern for the equal moral and political status of persons.   
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This meta-theoretical commitment about the appropriate way to justify 
principles is a higher order commitment that allows us to restrain ourselves in public 
and not insist on specific (liberal or other) conception of justice based on our own 
comprehensive views. While promoting what we believe is the ‘truly just’ way to 
organize social institutions is the most rational thing for us to do from a first person 
perspective, in public justification we examine the problem of justice from a second 
person perspective, and ask the question what is reasonable for others to accept.  
One might object that taking such a point of view is less burdensome from a 
liberal perspective, than from any other religious or moral doctrine, given that it 
already involves a commitment to not coerce our views on others when disagreement 
occurs. Why, I might then ask, so many liberals insist on liberal principles of justice 
through comprehensive liberal justification (Kantian, Utilitarian or other), instead of 
promoting a truly liberal justification, that treats each and every addressee of 
justification as equally valid source of moral claims? If this were the case, every 
liberal would be a strong advocate of public justification.  
The Rawlsian perspective allows liberalism to exercise self-criticism, “to 
apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself,”119 by admitting that justice as 
fairness is only one among the many acceptable conceptions of justice.120 As long as 
the meta-commitment to the appropriate form of justification is respected, more than 
one conception of justice can be arrived at. Liberalism of justification allows for a 
variety of liberalisms about justice. Justice as fairness might be the preferred theory 
of Rawls, being a strongly committed Kantian in his comprehensive view. A 
committed Kantian, however, recognizes others as valid sources of claims, and treats 
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them as such by taking the plurality of their points of view seriously, when offering 
them arguments for principles of justice. This view on justification might be called 
justificatory egalitarianism, according to which treating people as equals by offering 
them reasons that they can accept, is the appropriate understanding of egalitarian 
concern. This is the deepest sense of treating others as free and equal: as equally 
valid sources of moral claims. 
I believed I have advanced a plausible moral defense of public justification as 
an appropriate starting point for liberal/egalitarian principles of justice. Moving to 
the problem of global public justification, there are at least two challenges to be met. 
1.) Whether public justification is bounded to liberal democracies or not (Onora 
O’Neill). 2.) Whether the global public culture robust enough to support global 
egalitarianism (Leif Wenar). 
 
3.5. The Idea of Justificatory Egalitarianism 
 
An egalitarian theory of justice, in order for it to be consistently egalitarian, must rest 
on an egalitarian theory of justification. Treating people as equals involves offering 
them justification that they can reasonably accept, or at least offering them 
justification that according to our best judgment incorporates a philosophical account 
of its potential success. Therefore, in a pluralist world, and even more so under 
conditions of global pluralism, reasonable justification cannot start from particular 
beliefs only some of us endorse as true premises. Global conceptions of justice need 
to make sense to those global agents the justification is addressed to and whose 
actions are to be guided by the principles of justice. Treating people as equal at the 
global level is offering them principles and justification they could not reasonable 
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reject.  That is, before we can conclude what global justice requires we need to 
understand what is it that makes global justice make sense, that is, what a reasonable 
justification of global principles requires. 
 
 
3.6. Towards Global Public Justification 
 
In the previous section I have concluded that an egalitarian theory of justice, in order 
for it to be consistently egalitarian, must rest on an egalitarian theory of justification. 
Treating people as equals involves offering them justification that they can 
reasonably accept, or at least offering them justification that, according to our best 
judgment, incorporates a philosophical account of its potential success. In a pluralist 
world justification cannot start from particular beliefs only some of us endorse as 
true premises. A global conception of justice need to make sense to those global 
agents the justification is addressed to, and whose actions are to be guided by the 
principles of justice. Treating people as equals at the global level is offering others 
principles and their justification they could reasonably accept or could not reasonably 
reject. The conception of global justice that an egalitarian should promote is one that 
treats others as equals in reasoning about justice. In other words, global 
egalitarianism must be based on a sort of justificatory egalitarianism and given 
global pluralism, its source must be public and not a specific political tradition (such 
as comprehensive liberalism).  
Objection 2: Bounded Justice. Constructing principles of justice, which could 
be justified to a pluralist audience, the theorist needs to work from premises already 
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shared, rooted in our public culture, in our public institutions and their shared 
interpretations. 
However, if the construction of principles starts from fundamental values 
rooted in a society, then what follows is that the justifiability of the principles are 
bounded in their reach to the specific context, for which the considerations were 
made in the first place. As Onora O’Neill has forcefully argued, the Rawlsian 
political conception of justice does, indeed, seems to stop at the borders of a liberal 
democracy, which incorporates the moral premises of public justification. O’Neill 
argues that constructivist arguments, such as the Rawlsian political justification, 
cannot reach  
“all possible audiences: they are based on the shared conceptions of citizens, 
so provide reasons for action only for those whose most basic commitments 
they presuppose.”121  
 
If the content of the constructed principles relies on publicly embedded 
shared understanding, then, they will only be justifiable in a context where the initial 
assumptions could be shared. In other words, the public culture that informs the 
premises of the argument constitutes the boundaries of a conception of justice. It 
seems then, that the justificatory audience, the group of persons among whom certain 
public ideas can be taken for granted, does constitute some sort of a justificatory 
boundary for the principles of justice. The boundary is peculiar, however. It is a 
conceptual boundary, defined by the limits of justifiability.  
Is public justification really bounded to a liberal democratic society, though? 
The limits of extension, is tied only to the content of the principles, which have a 
limited normative appeal beyond the relevant political context. Starting from a liberal 
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public culture and liberal public ideals, it is easy to see how and why the principles 
constructed will have a limited appeal, and why it might be rejected by those not 
subscribing to such liberal democratic ideals. Even though the Rawlsian liberal 
conception of justice is tied to the audience of a liberal democracy, it seems that the 
method itself, that is, public justification, is extendable to different contexts. It seems 
at least theoretically plausible to think of a conception of global justice justified on 
global public grounds. 
Objection 3: Global public culture not robust enough. Before a direct 
extension of public justification from the domestic to the global level, there is an 
argument that should make us cautious about how we proceed. In defending the 
rationale behind the Law of Peoples, and clarifying why Rawls is not a global 
egalitarian, Leif Wenar poses a powerful challenge to global egalitarians. The reason 
why, in Wenar’s view, Rawls is not a global egalitarian lies in the nature of a global 
public culture and the fundamental ideas that can be found within. A full blown 
cosmopolitan liberalism (Beitz, Pogge) promoting a global difference principle 
would require a global original positions among individuals. In the domestic case, 
the idea of free and equal citizens and society as a fair system of social cooperation 
provide the underlying public ideals from which the original position is laid out. The 
global public culture, in Wenar’s view, is an insufficient source for such ideals to be 
found, hence it cannot support a global original position and a conception of global 
egalitarianism. As he says: 
“There is simply no robust global public culture which emphasizes that 
citizens of different countries ought to relate fairly to one another as free and 
equal within a single scheme of social cooperation. Much less is there in this 
global public culture the strongly egalitarian ideal that the distribution of 
global resources and wealth among individuals should not be based on 
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characteristics of individuals that are arbitrary from a moral point of 
view.”122  
  
There are two main contentions here. First, that global public culture is 
primarily focused on states and their relations. As Wenar says, it “is primarily 
international not interpersonal.” That is, what individuals owe each other in terms of 
distributive justice, what kind of justification they owe each other for their global 
relations, and how they ought to relate to each other across borders is primarily 
mediated by nation-states. There is little evidence in international law, treaties etc. 
that individuals and their relations to one another really matter. So the idea of free 
and equal global citizens is not an idea that is currently embedded in global public 
culture, hence a principle based on such a premise would be unjustifiable. Second, 
Wenar contends that a global difference principle relies on a notion distributive 
equality according to which a departure from equal distribution requires justification 
(morally arbitrary inequalities are impermissible.) Such a premise simply does not 
exist in form of a global public ideal. It is subject to reasonable disagreement.  
I tend to agree with Wenar that a global difference principle might be out of 
reach. However (on his first point) whether there are sources of freedom and equality 
among persons of a relevant kind is still to be shown, in my view. The ideal of 
person in the Rawlsian framework (free and equal citizens) does not amount to 
anything else, but the assumption that we are all equally valid sources of claims upon 
the institutions that pervasively affect our lives. Why cannot global individuals be 
considered as the relevant agents having claims on global institutions, and ask for a 
justification from those who impose those rules that significantly affect their lives? 
Justifying our actions to others, offering them justification for the terms of our 
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cooperation, that is, for the principles that govern our global institutions, is not 
merely the business of nation-states and their delegates. Insofar as global institutions 
affect the life-chances of individuals across the globe in a significant way and insofar 
as that effect can vary both between states and within states, individuals should 
matter. And we should not give up so easily by saying that international law, treaties 
and other documents are not would not support such an idea of equal claims of 
persons towards global institutions. If we look carefully at international sources, we 
might well find some good sources.  
Three elements of discrepancy between the domestic and the global context 
seem to be crucial:   
1.) Source: Global Public Culture 
Could global norms and institutions and their shared interpretations in 
domestic and international law serve as the public ground for constructing global 
justice? If yes, what kind of premises would such a global public culture support? 
2.) Role and purpose of global cooperation: Global Society  
One needs to understand what a global society is, what it is for, and whether 
there could be any meaningful convergence or consensus on the moral ideal it should 
aspire for.  
3.) Relevant agents: Members 
One needs to work out a conception of the relevant members in terms of their 
interests and relevant capacities. Given that we can conceive of a minimally shared 
notion of what the global society ought to be, we need to think of the members 
meaningfully participating in such a society, whether individuals, states or peoples, 
or some other set of agents.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
The Feasibility Challenge to Global Egalitarianism 
 
 
 
  
 
4.1. The Feasibility Problem 
 
“Taking people as they are and laws as they might be” is a classical idea that has 
been guiding political philosophers for centuries. As obvious as it might seem, it 
incorporates a genuine dilemma for political philosophy. While aiming at standards 
that critically assess our current institutions and setting the horizon for social change 
and moral progress, principles, at the same time, aim at being action guiding. 
“Taking people as they are”, expresses the concern that political principles must be 
such that the relevant agents can be moved by them. “Laws as they might be” instead 
expresses the equally important concern about the suitable viewpoint for moral and 
political assessment and criticism. So the dilemma is: How can we come up with 
principles of political morality that will appeal to, and be sufficiently action guiding 
for the relevant agents and, at the same time, set normative standards for them to 
strive for? Striking this balance is challenging, but not impossible, and as I will 
argue, this fine balance is what a feasible theory of global justice should be 
concerned with. How this challenge is met by theories of justice and what are their 
implications for the global case, is what this chapter is set out to discover. 
 According to the feasibility challenge to global egalitarianism the normative 
ideal the conception promotes or the institutional scheme it envisions is infeasible. 
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The feasibility challenge for a theory of justice is the following. Certain aspects of 
our social world are relevant in order for the theory to be action guiding, while other 
aspects of our social world are exactly what we need to be critically assessing. 
Therefore, a theorist needs to discern which facts to account for as unchangeable, 
hence as relevant constraints on the theory, and which ones to consider as object of 
critical assessment and social change. Some feasibility constraints are related to facts 
about human psychology and motivation while others are related to facts about our 
social world, institutions and resources. Given the scope and focus of my 
dissertation, I addressed one type of feasibility constraint, the fact of pluralism about 
moral views, which is likely to constrain the kinds of principles that can be accepted 
by others and hence the kind of justification that can be given in their support. 
Feasibility critics are likely to challenge global egalitarianism at the level of 
application and institutional design. Taking pluralism as a feasibility constraint, 
however, I argue that part of the feasibility charges can be already addressed at the 
level of justification. I argue that public justification is the kind of justification that is 
able to account for pluralism as a feasibility constraint, and brings a normative 
political ideal closer to a feasible ideal that might be potentially successful in 
application. 
The feasibility challenge to global egalitarianism has been formulated in a 
number of different ways. They can be grouped under five different categories of in-
feasibility. 
(a) Global Leviathan. The first kind of feasibility challenge is motivated by a 
genuine fear concerning the tyrannical tendencies of a world government. 
Although it is not at all clear that global egalitarianism as an institutional 
standard must necessarily require a centralized world state. 
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(b) International Status Quo. Second, global egalitarianism is unfeasible 
given the current historical circumstances of the state system and power 
holder’s (nation states) unwillingness to delegate some of their authorities to 
supranational bodies.  
 (c) Self-regarding interest. Third, global egalitarianism makes too strong 
demands on well-off citizens (of well-off nations) to share their resources 
with poorer citizens (of poorer nations)  
 (d) Cultural Diversity: Fourth, unfeasibility can be a claim about the inherent 
difficulty of arriving at a common understanding of justice given the diversity 
of cultures and traditions across the globe.  
(e) Utopia. Most commonly, however, it is used simply as another way of 
saying that the world is not ready for so radical, idealistic or utopian ideas.  
What are we to make of these challenges? In what sense is global 
egalitarianism unfeasible, if at all? By caching out the different meanings of 
feasibility motivating these charges, and critically analyzing them, we can come to a 
more robust understanding of what a feasible theory of global egalitarianism 
requires. 
A distinction that lends itself to comparing these different charges draws on 
the classical Hume-ian distinction between the subjective  and objective 
circumstances of justice.  
i. Subjective Circumstances Of Justice. Some of the charges, (b) and (c), 
express a concern about people’s (un)willingness to support proposals for change 
through their political influence, their votes or their taxes. It assumes that nations and 
their citizens have certain fundamental interests (mostly self-regarding) that move 
them to act in certain ways. Global egalitarianism requires them to put aside their 
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basic intuitions or fundamental interests in order to fulfill moral ideals that make too 
strong demands on them. It makes a reference to what principles can motivate people 
to act or what principles can be action-guiding? In this sense a feasible conception of 
justice is one that is sufficiently action-guiding for the relevant agents; i.e. sensitive 
to the relevant facts about the relevant agents.  
ii. Objective Circumstances Of Justice. Claim (b) and (d) refer to general 
facts about the world, such as cultural diversity or the current international system of 
nation-states. These charges seem to embody more structural features, facts about the 
world relevant for the problem at hand. In this sense a conception of global justice is 
feasible insofar as it is sensitive to the relevant facts about the world.  
Another distinction that has been made concerning the different feasibility 
charges is the one between political feasibility and the feasibility condition in 
political theory.123 Feasibility in the political sense refers to the fact that a decision 
could be implemented into institutions in a foreseeable time-frame. While feasibility 
in political theory is concerned with “what one is justified in thinking about the 
moral status of … institutions.” The idea of political feasibility is rather appealing to 
our common sense notion of feasibility. For a decision to be politically feasible one 
has to take into account budgetary, bureaucratic, institutional or socio-cultural 
constraints and people’s moral and political opinions (i.e. actual beliefs) that approve 
of or condemn institutional arrangements.  
The feasibility condition in political theory is a different notion. As Raikka 
says,  
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[e]ven if a political theory should recommend only institutional 
arrangements that are possible and practicable, it need not recommend 
institutional arrangements that are politically feasible as well.124 
 
Why is it so? Conceptually the distinction between the two is rather easy to prove. 
Take any political ideal (e.g. democracy, universal suffrage, abolition of slavery etc.) 
that at a certain point in history seemed very unlikely to be politically feasible and 
that have awaited centuries to be achieved in our social institutions. So, short-term 
political unfeasibility, what seems to be unrealizable in institutions here and now, 
does not mean that the normative idea is unfeasible. After all, it has proved to be 
feasible in the long run. What does feasibility of a normative idea mean, then? This 
feasibility in the normative sense is what this paper is concerned with. 
Feasibility, in this sense, is a problem of what one ought to think about the 
subject matter of political theory. It is an ideal theory and what we are evaluating 
with feasibility is whether it is possible to achieve or not. When assessing whether an 
ideal is possible to achieve, we are concerned with the necessary costs of the change 
it would imply if it were implemented in our social arrangements. While the 
feasibility of a social policy (i.e. political feasibility) involves costs in economic 
terms, what is relevant for feasibility in political theory are the moral costs. One has 
to assess the “necessary moral costs of the changeover to the ideal world” 125A 
feasible normative idea is based on a set of constraints one can reasonably assume 
about the society and its members, which are relevant to the problem at hand.  
Raikka’s distinction draws on an intuition according to which the fact that 
some people, or even the majority, does not support (public opinion) an institutional 
scheme a political ideal would suggest, or that the means (resources, know-how) for 
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realizing such institutions are not available for the society, surely cannot disqualify a 
political ideal to be a normative yardstick steering social and political change. There 
are certain type of costs, such as the disapproval of public opinion, resources or 
know-how that constitute a feasibility constraints in the political sense. So what 
exactly makes a political ideal unfeasible in the theoretical sense? We might think of 
a political ideal, which, even if all the resources and means were available for a 
society to implement them tomorrow, it would not be able to attain the compliance of 
the relevant agents due to the unbearable moral costs it would impose on them.  
 
 
4.2.  Feasibility between Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 
 
Justification and feasibility are often thought of as separate concerns involved in two 
different levels of inquiry about justice: ideal and non-ideal theorizing. Ideal theory, 
at least in the Rawlsian sense, envisions a society in which all its members comply 
with the requirements of justice and in which the social-economic conditions are 
favorable. That is, the theorists makes certain idealizing assumptions concerning 
people’s willingness and ability to comply with whatever principles of justice the 
theory yields, and concerning the resource base of the society as capable of 
supporting a variety of ways of life, neither being too scarce thereby rendering 
justice impossible, nor being too abundant, thereby making justice unnecessary. 
Constructing justice under these ideal circumstances facilitates systematic thinking 
towards the best set of social institutions we can hope for. This is, however, not all 
there is to reasoning about justice. 
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A theory of justice is thought of as a sequence, moving from ideal theory to 
non-ideal theory by relaxing the above idealizing assumptions, one-by-one, in order 
to face the real world challenges which set limits to the application of our principles 
articulated in the first phase of the theory. Insufficient human motivation and 
unfavorable social circumstances might constrain the potential application of our 
principles in institutions under non-ideal circumstances. These facts about persons 
and society can be referred to as ‘motivational constraints’ and ‘resource 
constraints.’  With a common term these might be called feasibility constraints on a 
theory of justice.  
At first sight, it seems that while non-ideal theory is concerned with facts 
about the world and the sort of institutions that are possible, ideal theory is not. In 
other words, the problem of feasibility seems to be a secondary concern left aside for 
non-ideal theorizing. I seek to challenge this sharp distinction, by showing that there 
is one sense in which ideal theory is (and should) be concerned with facts. Rawls 
calls them permanent facts concerning human motivation and the historical 
circumstances of our society; they are likely to persist over time and can be 
considered as law-like elements of human societies. These permanent facts might be 
distinguished from what we might call the changeable facts; the kind of facts that a 
normative theory aims at changing or reforming. 
For a better grasp of the distinction between permanent and changeable facts 
of our social world, consider the genuine dilemma for any normative theory. 
Principles of political morality aim at being action-guiding. This notion, however, 
contains the paradox of moral and political philosophy, insofar as acting and guiding 
require the theorist to endorse two different standpoints. On the one hand, political 
principles must be such that the relevant agents can be motivated to act upon them. 
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On the other hand, a normative point of view must provide a standard for moral and 
political criticism by setting the horizons for social change and moral progress. So 
the genuine dilemma is the following: How can principles of political morality 
appeal to, and be sufficiently action guiding for the relevant agents and, at the same 
time, formulate standards that challenge the boundaries of the practically possible?  
Certain aspects of our social world are relevant in order for the theory to be action 
guiding, while other conditions of our social world are exactly what we need to be 
critically assessing. So, when assessing the social world one needs to discern which 
facts to account for as relevant constraints on the theory, and which ones to consider 
as an object of critical assessment and change. Permanent facts of persons and 
society are relevant for the action-guidingness of the theory, while changeable facts 
are the facts we can (or hope to) change. Discerning these different kinds of facts is a 
rather challenging task for any normative theory. Rawls, for example talks about 
certain limiting conditions or “historical conditions to which we should be 
reconciled,” such as the fact of reasonable pluralism, while political and social 
institutions are taken to be changeable. 
This fact of reasonable pluralism limits what is practically possible here and 
now… [However] the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for 
we can to a greater or lesser extent change political and social institutions 
and much else. Hence we have to rely on conjecture and speculation, arguing 
that the social world we envision is feasible and might actually exist …126 
 
In constructing principles of justice, in ideal theory, we can (and should) already 
account for the permanent facts that make our philosophical enterprise more open to 
success when the action-guidingness of our principles is at stake. In this sense, 
feasibility becomes a relevant evaluative criterion for constructing principles of 
                                                
126
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 17. 
 106 
justice, and we will be looking at discerning the relevant facts to account for in our 
justificatory approach. 
 
 
4.3. Feasibility between Justification and Application 
 
Providing reasons for a justified conception of justice and for a feasible conception 
of justice are often thought of as independent theoretical enterprises. On the common 
view, justification is the normative enterprise explicating a coherent set of underlying 
reasons that support a principle from philosophical foundations, while feasibility is 
concerned with the problem of institutional design and policy-making, that is, the 
application of our justified political ideals under the circumstances of here and now. 
In this chapter I challenge this strict distinction by arguing that there is at least one 
sense in which feasibility becomes a relevant consideration in the justificatory 
enterprise itself. One can hold a normative theory of justification according to which 
an account of feasibility is a necessary requirement for properly justifying principles 
of justice. As I will argue it is, indeed, the preferred theory of justification for 
principles of justice. More specifically, an account of a feasible justification is 
something an egalitarian conception of justice cannot do without, in order for it to be  
I examine the political turn  in the Rawlsian theory of justice, in order to 
show that there are good reasons to endorse political justification as the appropriate 
form of justification for principles of justice. Some welcomed Rawls’ restatement as 
‘epistemic humility,’  or as well-founded ‘epistemic restraint,’  others rejected it as 
‘epistemic abstinence,’  or liberal skepticism, wile still others took it to be a move 
towards founding principles of justice on contingent facts qua facts alone . I try to 
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show that taking the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ (from here on pluralism) seriously 
neither amounts to founding principles of justice on contingent facts, nor is it a 
strategic move of a philosopher with a practical concern who endorses a certain 
conception of justice at home (as true) and promotes another conception of justice in 
public (as reasonable). I argue that pluralism is a relevant feasibility constraint on the 
justification of principles of justice. The concern with feasibility, i.e. with the 
potential success of his justificatory strategy, explains the political turn in the 
Rawlsian theory towards grounding principles of justice on political ideals embedded 
in public life. I argue that the political turn, which consists in bracketing 
controversial debates about moral truth, is neither a form of skepticism nor a political 
maneuver. What follows, I argue, is that the distinction between a justified 
conception of justice and a feasible conception of justice is not a matter of best and 
second-best. Rather the putative second-best status of a feasible conception of justice 
depends on how one understands the role of justice, the role of political philosophy, 
and the relevant notion of justification. Hence, depending on the normative theory of 
justification we offer, our putative second-best can, in turn, become the best we can 
hope for.  
What does it mean for a conception of justice to be justified in the Rawlsian 
sense? On a common understanding we often take justification to be logical proof 
from correct premises to thereby correct conclusions. This is a first person 
perspective on justification in the sense of providing reasons for one’s conclusions in 
an attempt to appeal to the other. This notion of might be distinguished from 
justification as the potential acceptability of principles by whom the justification is 
addressed to. This is a second person perspective according to which a principle is 
justified insofar as the justification offered can be accepted or cannot be rejected by 
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the other.  For a better grasp of these two distinct phases of justification, one might 
think of justification as an attempt to provide logically compelling grounds for a 
conception of justice, and acceptability as the successful practice of justification. 
 a.) justification as attempt concept: providing justification (first-person) 
 b.) justification as success concept: accepting justification (second-person) 
The combination of the two leaves us a third option. Our first-person aim to justify 
our principles to others might attempt to account for the second-person perspective, 
thereby anticipating the potential success of justification. 
c.) justification as a potential success concept: accounting for the relevant 
facts that potentially constrain the acceptability of principles (‘could be 
accepted,’ ‘could not be rejected’) 
The Rawlsian notion of justification is the third notion of justification. I take this to 
be the most plausible philosophical account of what justification of principles should 
entail. As Rawls says, 
justifying a conception of justice to someone is to give him proof of its 
principles from premises that we both accept, these principles having in turn 
consequences that match our considered judgments. Thus mere proof is not 
justification. … proofs become justification once the starting points are 
mutually recognized127 
 
Attempt and success concepts of justification represent the two phases of one and the 
same justificatory strategy. A plausible justification cannot start from premises one 
merely takes to be true. As he says mere proof is no justification at all. In order for a 
justification to be plausible one has to account for why the premises we start from 
could be acceptable by those the justification is addressed to. While such justification 
cannot guarantee that the principles will, in fact, have consequences on our 
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considered judgments, it can, at least, anticipate a potential success. This 
philosophical anticipation of the potential success of justification consists in an 
argument why we may think that the premises could be mutually recognized, hence 
our principles could be action-guiding for the relevant agents. Justification, in this 
sense, is not about guaranteeing that our arguments will be convincing for all. 
Justification as a potential success concept involves an account of the relevant facts 
that might constrain the acceptability of our principles. These are what I take to be 
the feasibility constraints on the justification of a conception of justice. If these 
constraints are not accounted for in the theory, then one can conclude from the 
theoretical standpoint that the justification provided will most likely fail. A plausible 
understanding of justification conveys not only the attempt, but also its potential 
success, by incorporating the relevant constraints in the justificatory strategy itself.  
 The concern with potential success in the application of principles and the 
stability of the institutions they lead to is widely referred to as “the feasibility issue” 
in political theory.  While theorists are likely to raise the problem at the level of 
application and institutional design, I believe, it makes sense to talk about feasibility 
constraints at the justificatory phase of a theory of justice, thereby bringing the 
problem of feasibility back to ideal-theory. In this sense, one might distinguish 
between a feasible application and a feasible justification. A feasible justification 
requires an account of those permanent facts in society that apparently constrain the 
potential justifiability and acceptability of the proposed principles. While there is no 
guarantee that a justification which accounts for the limits of justifiability will in fact 
motivate people to act, it can nevertheless speculate its potential success, thereby 
contributing to a more probable success at the phase of application and institutional 
design. Feasible justification might not be all there is to a feasible conception of 
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justice; however, it seems to be a relevant first step and a task that surely remains 
within the realm of political philosophy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this doctoral dissertation I defended and institutional account of global 
egalitarianism and argued that its justification must be carried out on global public 
grounds, in order for it to be egalitarian in its justification and feasible in its 
application. The first theoretical task was to account for the theoretical essentials of a 
theory of distributive justice and defend an institutional or practice dependent 
approach to global egalitarianism.  
Among the main philosophical challenges to global egalitarianism, I 
addressed the challenge from the domestic scope thesis, according to which duties of 
egalitarian distributive justice are confined to members of a nation-state due to the 
normative features underlying the scheme of domestic social and political 
institutions, the so called, basic structure. I discussed three different variants of this 
critique: 1.) the bounded contribution view, 2.) the bounded constituency view and 3.) 
the bounded cooperation view. I argue that none of these critiques warrant restricting 
the scope of justice to the domestic context.  
As a third contribution, I made an inquiry into the appropriate form of 
justification a global egalitarian conception requires. Global egalitarianism has been 
most notably justified through an extension of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, by I have 
argued that global egalitarianism grounded in cosmopolitan ideals or comprehensive 
liberal commitments would fail to appeal to a global justificatory public, 
characterized by doctrinal and religious disagreements. I have argued that a global 
egalitarian conception of justice must rest on global public grounds.  
Finally, I have addressed the feasibility challenge to global egalitarianism, 
according to which the normative ideal it promotes or the institutional scheme it 
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envisions is infeasible. Feasibility critics have challenged global egalitarianism at the 
level of application and institutional design. Conceptualizing the fact pluralism as a 
feasibility constraint on a theory of justice, I tried to show that part of the feasibility 
challenges can already be accounted for at the level of justification. I have argued 
that public justification is able to account for pluralism as a feasibility constraint, and 
brings a normative political ideal closer to a feasible ideal. 
The main theoretical findings of this doctoral thesis suggest two directions of 
extension for future research. Firstly, I have argued that given global pluralism a 
plausible justification of global norms and institutions must rest on global public 
grounds. However, what global public culture and global political ideals consist in, 
and in what sense can we speak of a global public to whom such a political 
constructivist justification might be addressed to, remains highly contested.  My 
planned research would involve a thorough conceptual analysis towards a 
constructivist account of global egalitarianism, as well as circumspect empirical 
research and analysis of global governance cases. 
I would aim at developing a conception of global public justification that 
draws on fundamental norms and values embedded in global public culture. Some 
have argued that the global public culture is not robust enough to support an 
egalitarian account of global justice. This claim is plausible if one construes 
international norms in a legal-political institutional framework in which global 
egalitarianism would require a world government with a global constitution in place. 
However, the theory and practice of international normativity has proven to be much 
more sophisticated, involving an account of agency and social change within a multi-
level institutional framework of governance networks. Global governance regimes, 
international treaties and institutions, jus cogens norms and customary law 
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underlying international court cases, global advocacy networks and movements, are 
only some of the many examples of international norms sufficiently recognized and 
observed by the relevant agents. For  circumspect analysis of the problem I would 
take on an interdisciplinary agenda and compare different accounts of the nature and 
the source of international norms. A comparative conceptual analysis between the 
ideas present in political philosophy, international law, international relations theory 
and European governance theories would be the appropriate approach towards  a 
plausible account of global normativity and the requirements of global public 
justification.  
Secondly, such a mature conceptual framework would allow me to work out 
concrete normative proposals for global governance cases, by applying the global 
public justificatory apparatus to global institutions and practices. One idea would be 
to demonstrate how egalitarianism in global health justice might be justified on 
global public grounds. Life-expectancy, one of the best indicators of average well-
being for global comparative assessment, is among the goods most unequally 
distributed across the globe. Prominent scholars of global health justice, Thomas 
Pogge, Norman Daniels and Gillian Brock among others, have shown that specific 
international institutions and agreements significantly affect such a distribution, 
which calls for normative justification. By selecting a few model-cases, such as the 
problem of intellectual property rights on life-saving medicine or the bi-lateral 
agreements concerning the brain drain of health care workers, I would try to show 
how their moral assessment might be carried out drawing on relevant norms and 
values embedded in global public culture. 
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